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Résumé : Connor et Lande (2006) survolent la littérature sur les majorations de prix imposées par les cartels et concluent à une 
augmentation moyenne variant entre 31% et 49%. Considérant un échantillon plus grand, Connor (2010b) trouve une 
médiane de 23,3% pour tous les types de cartel et une moyenne de 50,4% pour les cartels dont les majorations de prix 
estimées sont positives. Cependant, les échantillons utilisés dans ces études sont constitués d’estimations et non pas 
d’observations directes. De ce fait, ces échantillons héritent possiblement d’erreurs de modélisation et d’estimation, 
ainsi que d’un biais de publication. Une analyse sommaire des majorations dans l’échantillon de Connor révèle une 
distribution asymétrique, de l’hétérogénéité et la présence d’observations aberrantes. Ainsi, au-delà du fait que les 
estimations d’augmentation de prix par les cartels sont potentiellement biaisées, l’estimation d’un modèle par MCO 
avec de telles données sans un traitement adéquat de l’asymétrie, de l’hétérogénéité et des données aberrantes 
produirait des résultats déformés. Nous réalisons une nouvelle méta- analyse dans le même esprit que celui de Connor 
and Bolotova (2006), mais en proposant une prise en compte adéquate des problèmes mentionnés ci-dessus. Après 
correction du biais d’estimation, nos résultats suggèrent que la moyenne des majorations de prix estimées est de 
l’ordre de 13,6% avec une médiane de 13.6% pour les cartels dont les estimations de majoration de prix se situaient 
initialement entre 0% et 50% et de l’ordre de 17,5% avec une médiane de 14.1% pour tous les types de cartels. 
Abstract: Connor and Lande (2006) conducted a survey of cartel overcharge estimates and found an average in the range of 
31% to 49%. By examining more sources, Connor (2010b) finds a median of 23.3% for all type of cartels and a mean 
of 50.4% for successful cartels. However, the data used in these studies are estimates rather than true observations, 
since the true illegal profits of cartels are rarely observable. Therefore, these data are subject to model error, 
estimation error and publication bias. A quick glance at the Connor database reveals that the universe of overcharge 
estimates is asymmetric, heterogenous and contains a number of influential observations. Beside the fact that 
overcharge estimates are potentially biased, fitting a linear OLS model to the data without providing a careful 
treatment of the problems raised by the publication bias, outliers, asymmetry, and heterogeneity will necessarily 
produce distorted results. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates in the spirit of Connor and 
Bolotova (2006), but providing a sound treatment of the matters raised above. We find for cartels with initial 
overcharge estimates lying between 0% and 50%.a bias-corrected mean overcharge estimate of 13.6% with a median 
of 13.6% and for all cartels of all types a bias-corrected mean of 17.5% with a median of 14.1%. 
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1.  Introduction: the representative mean cartel overcharge 
A cartel is a group of independent firms which collectively agree to coordinate their 
supply, pricing or other marketing policies in order to make larger profits than they would when 
"natural competition" prevails. Depending on the market of interest, the natural competition can be 
pure and perfect, oligopolistic or monopolistic, with firm strategies either centered on (static) short 
term profit maximization or on (dynamic) long term value maximization, the latter giving rise to 
non-cooperative “natural competition” industry equilibria that may in different aspects resemble 
collusive equilibria.1 The price that would prevail absent the explicit cartel conspiracy is called the 
"but-for price". When a cartel succeeds at raising its price, the amount it charges in excess of the 
but-for price is called the "cartel overcharge". Firms may collude if the incremental payoff 
generated by the overcharge is more than sufficient to cover the cartel costs. This incremental 
payoff comes from the overcharge paid by those consumers who are able and willing to pay the 
higher price set by the cartel, from which the profit loss firms incur on the reduced sales must be 
deducted. The surplus that accrue to consumers who do not buy at higher prices than the natural 
competition level is a deadweight loss for society. As the social welfare is generally increased 
when more competition prevails, one must acknowledge that cartels in pursuing their goals are 
harmful for society. 
Most advanced economies consider cartels as illegal and are endowed with antitrust 
policies, i.e. legislations aimed at deterring the formation of cartels. For example, the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) recommends a base fine of 10% of the affected volume of 
commerce to a firm convicted of cartel collusion. To this base fine, another 10% is added for the 
harms "inflicted upon consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the 
higher price". This yields a fine of 20% that may also undergo some adjustments for aggravating 
and mitigating factors. The total financial fine ranges from 15% to 80% of affected sales. In 
addition, there is a possibility of incarceration for the individuals involved in the collusion. In the 
European Union (EU), the antitrust policy is implemented by the European Competition 
Commission. The amount of the fine takes into account the severity of the damages inflicted upon 
consumers as well as some aggravating and mitigating factors, but the total fine must not exceed 
10% of the overall turnover or global sales of the firm. 
Cohen and Scheffman (1989) argued that an increase of 1% of a price above its natural 
competition level usually results in a reduction of sales of more than 1%. Based on this, they 
concluded that "at least in price-fixing cases involving a large volume of commerce, ten percent is 
                                                            
1 Hence some of those dynamic long term value maximizing non-cooperative “natural competition” stategic 
industry equilibria namely those that resemble collusive equilibria are at times refered to, somewhat 
improperly, as “tacit collusion” equilibria.  
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almost certainly too high". They claimed that "The Justice Department’s assertion that price-fixing 
conspiracies would typically result in a mark-up over competitive level of ten percent, or that the 
probability of detection of price-fixing or bid-rigging would be as small as ten percent is not 
supported by the available evidence. Both of these Justice Department assertions are especially 
untenable for conspiracies involving private for-profit purchasers. This conclusion has important 
implications because of the potential inefficiencies that may arise from overdeterrence."  
On the other hand, Connor and Lande (2006) conducted a survey of cartel overcharge 
estimates by examining more than 500 refereed journal articles, working papers, monographs, and 
books. They found an average cartel overcharge in the range of 31% to 49% and a median 
overcharge in the range of 22% to 25% of affected commerce. Based on this, they concluded that 
"the current Sentencing Commission presumption that cartels overcharge on average by 10% is 
much too low, and the current levels of cartel penalties should be increased significantly". After 
collecting and examining a larger data set, Connor (2010b) concludes that "...penalty guidelines 
aimed at optimally deterring cartels ought to be increased". Combe and Monnier (2009) performed 
an analysis of 64 cartels prosecuted by the European Commission and arrived at the conclusion that 
"fines imposed against cartels by the European Commission are overall sub optimal". 
Hence there are disagreements among economists, not only about how to optimally set the 
fine in cartel cases, but also about the magnitude of the overcharge. The first matter is primarily of 
theoretical nature. A well-known fining rule is given by the so-called Becker-Landes formula, 
which stipulates that the optimal fine is equal to the harm caused to society by cartels divided by 
the probability of detection (See Becker 1968 and Landes 1983). The proper definition of the 
probability of detection and conviction is itself subject to different interpretation. In turn, the harm 
caused to society is equal to the cartel overcharge plus additional social costs caused by the 
presence of cartels, namely the deadweight losses caused by cartels and the resources devoted to 
antitrust authorities for fighting cartels.2 The current paper deals with cartel overcharges and 
provides an order of magnitude of the overcharge of the representative cartel. 
The sample used for our study is an extended but qualitatively similar version of the one 
used in Connor (2010b).3 The raw database consists of 1178 cartels, from which we exclude 58 
cartels with missing information. This leaves us with a  sample of 1120 cartels with overcharge 
estimates ranging from 0% to 1800%. We will refer to it as the Connor database or Connor sample. 
The mean overcharge estimate is 45.5%, but 49% for strictly positive estimates. This average is 
20.6% for the cartels with overcharge estimates lying strictly between 0% and 50%, representing 
70% of the sample. Estimates that are larger than or equal to 50% represent 22.6% of the sample, 
                                                            
2 One may add other effects of cartels such as their impact on investment and employment, on entry and exit 
dynamics, on innovation and learning curve, etc.   
3 We sincerely thank Professor John Connor for generously making his database available to us. 
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and the average overcharge estimate for this subsample is 137.3%. A close look at the data show 
that the 49% mean overcharge is actually due to the presence of a small number of influential 
observations. For example, when the 5% largest observations are left out of the Connor sample, the 
average overcharge estimate drops from 49% to 32%. But the argumentation of Cohen and 
Scheffman (1989) based on the theory of mark-ups suggests that an overcharge of more than 10% 
is “beyond belief.” This leads to question whether the majority of estimates available in the 
literature, and in particular those used in Connor (2010b), overstate the actual overcharges. Often, 
the decision to estimate the overcharge is made upon presumption of collusion. Therefore, the 
extent to which this presumption affects overcharge estimates is an important question to 
investigate. 
To sharpen our intuitions, we re-examined the methodology that consists of converting a 
Lerner index into an overcharge. In many instances, Connor (2010b) used this methodology to 
obtain overcharge estimates by assuming that the situation that would prevail absent the cartel is 
perfect competition. However, product differentiation and other industy-specific factors may 
generate market power that allows firms to apply significant mark-ups over marginal cost. We 
show that not accounting for the presence of such mark-ups causes overcharge estimates obtained 
by conversion of Lerner indices to overstate the overchage by potentially large margins. Based on 
this result, one can reasonably suspect that any other estimation method is susceptible of 
introducing a particular type of bias. Indeed, the magnitude of some overcharge estimates in the 
Connor database and the simplicity of the estimation methods used in many papers make the 
presence of substantial estimation bias plausible.  
One way to verify if overcharge estimates are biased is to perform a meta-analysis, as in 
the seminal paper of Connor and Bolotova (2006). In the meta-analysis, overcharge estimates are 
regressed on two groups of variables. The first group is comprised of variables that in theory  could 
explain or influence the size of the true overcharge (e.g. the characteristics of the cartel), while the 
second group gathers variables that in theory should not, and therefore are susceptible of capturing 
an estimation bias (e.g. the computation method and the publication source). The study of Connor 
and Bolotova (2006) provides evidence that part of the variability of overcharge estimates is 
actually due to the computation method and publication source. Another problem in the data is, as 
mentioned above, the presence of influential observations or ouliers. Such influential observations 
must be excluded from the meta-analysis if one wishes to avoid distorting the estimated 
coefficients, while wishing to draw conclusions that apply for the vast majority of cartels.   
We conduct a new meta-analysis by introducing three refinements with respect to Connor 
and Bolotova (2006). In a first step, we remove the cartels with alleged overcharge estimates that 
are larger than or equal to 50% as well as zero overcharge estimates representing 7.2% of the 
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sample because the proportion of such estimates is highly susceptible of being affected by the 
publication bias. Second, we use a K-means analysis to separate the sample of overcharges into 
four “homogenous” groups. And third, we model the logarithm of overcharges as a linear function 
of the explanatory variables mentioned above, while assuming that the coefficients of variables that 
capture the bias vary across the clusters identified in the K-means analysis. This log-linear 
specification appears to be less subject to distortions caused by influential observations, and 
explains the variance of the overcharge estimates to a greater extent than the standard linear 
specification. Since the zero overcharges have been excluded, no log-of-zero problem arises. In the 
regressions, a Heckman type correction is used to eliminate the sample selection bias due to the 
exclusion of zeros and outliers.  
It should be emphasized that the exclusion of zeros and outliers in the first step is 
motivated by two distinct and equally important reasons. First, such observations are more 
susceptible than the other observations of being affected by estimation and publication biases. 
Second, even if these observations were measured without bias, their inclusion in OLS regressions 
would distort the estimation results. Note that in the log-linear regression, the log of zero is minus 
infinity and thus, is the largest possible outlier. However, by removing the problematic 
observations, we create a sample selection problem. This well known and documented problem can 
be controlled by a Heckman-type regression. 
Our results show that the bias captured by the estimation method and the publication 
source is substantial and economically significant. The bias-corrected estimates obtained from the 
meta-analysis by adequately neutralizing the effects of those variables suggest that the 
representative average overcharge estimate for cartels with initial overcharge estimates above 0% 
and below 50% (the bulk of cartel cases) is approximately 13.62% (with a median of 13.63%), 
while the average for all types of cartels is approximately 17.52% (with a median of 14.05%). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing 
overcharge estimation methods and briefly discuss their respective drawbacks. In Section 3, we 
review the overcharge estimates presented in Connor (2010b) and show why one can reasonably 
express some doubts about the quality of some of these estimates. We proceed by providing 
concrete examples where Connor presents as cartel overcharge estimates numbers described as 
competitive mark-ups in the original publications. We also illustrate the danger of converting 
Lerner indices into overcharge estimates without caution. In Section 4, we discuss the 
philosophy underlying our meta-analysis and the econometric models used. In Section 5, 
we present in details the preprocessing that the raw data in the Connor sample must 
undergo in order to avoid drawing misleading conclusions from the empirical results. 
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Section 6 presents the determination of bias-corrected overcharges and the main empirical 
results. Section 7 concludes, and an appendix presents the description of the data. 
2.  The Overcharge Estimation Methods 
Let ݌෤ be the price imposed by the cartel and ݌ be the but-for price, i.e. the price that would 
prevail absent the cartel. Then the cartel overcharge is given by: 
Δ ൌ p෤ െ p (1) 
The overcharge expressed as a percentage of the but-for price becomes: 
δ ൌ ୮
෥ି୮
୮
   ሺ2ሻ 
While the cartel price ݌෤ is observed, the but-for price ݌ needs to be estimated. 
Many authors acknowledge that overcharges represent the bulk of the damages caused by 
cartels. This explains why the largest body of the economic literature on cartels has been devoted to 
their price effects. The methods often used by academic researchers and forensic economists to 
estimate the cartel overcharge can be summarized into 5 groups: price before/after the conspiracy, 
price during a price war, yardstick method, cost-based method, and econometric method. Each of 
these approaches is briefly explained below. 
2.1  The " before‐and‐after" Methods 
This method is based on the comparison of the price during the alleged cartel period with 
the price before and/or after the cartel. As pointed out by Connor (2007), 
" this method should be called the " with-and-without collusion method" since the " before" period 
is really any nonconspiracy period---whether before, after, or during an intermediate pause in 
price-fixing." 
This method does not control for shifts in demand or cost functions. For that reason, 
Connor (2010b states:"it is important that the " before" period be one that is quite comparable to 
the conspiracy period with respect to demand and supply conditions. Shifts in buyer preferences, 
appearance or the disappearance of substitutes, or changes in the cost of production of the 
cartelized product during the affected period can cause overstatement or understatement of the 
overcharge." 
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Figure1 
Before-and-After Methods  
  
The lack of robustness of the before-and-after method is illustrated by the following 
citation from Finkelstein and Levenback (1983):  
"An obvious idea is to assume that competitive prices during the conspiracy period would have 
been the same as they were before or after the conspiracy or in interludes of competition within the 
conspiracy period [...] This estimate, however, meets the immediate objection that it is likely to be 
incorrect because changes in factors affecting price other than the conspiracy would have 
produced changes in competitive prices if there had been competition during the conspiracy 
period."  
This lack of robustness is further enhanced by the difficulty of correctly specifying when 
the conspiracy begins and when it ends. Indeed, an incorrect specification of the conspiracy period 
may result in biased estimates and lead to wrong conclusions, as illustrated by the following 
citation from Levenstein, and Suslow (2002): 
"Connor writes that there was " disagreement about the dates of the conspiracy-effects period, the 
but-for price, and the type of industry conduct absent collusion... " Connor uses marginal cost 
(estimated from what he identifies as " highly competitive" periods) as the competitive price."  
2.2  The " Price during a price war" Method 
This method uses the price during a price war of laps of collusion to proxy the but-for 
price. This method is basically an instance of the before-and-after method and thus suffers from the 
same limitations. 
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Figure 2 
Price war interlude 
 
In Yinne (2003), the "overcharge is calculated as imports*price increase/(1+price increase), and 
the price increase is estimated from the observed price drop subsequent to the cartel's demise." 
Unfortunately, the price drop that is referred to in this citation is probably not driven by normal 
economic forces. In general, prices during a price war can be significantly lower than in natural 
competition equilibrium. As acknowledged by Connor (2007), "a predatory episode before cartel 
formation will strongly overestimate the overcharge, as happened in lysine."  
2.3  The Yardstick Method 
This method compares the prices during the conspiracy period with comparable or 
yardstick, assumed competitive firms, product or geographic markets during the alleged cartel 
period. The yardstick method should be used with caution because an increase in price due to 
domestic market cartelization can cause a partial demand shift toward nearby markets. Similar 
domestic firms that are not participating in the collusion will tend to follow the cartel price 
(umbrella effect). Connor (2010b) states:  
"The yardstick approach involves the identification of a market similar to the one in which prices 
were fixed but where prices were unaffected by the conspiracy. A yardstick market should have cost 
structures and demand characteristics highly comparable to the cartelized market, yet lie outside 
the orbit of the cartel's influence." 
Hence, the Yardstick method may not be appropriate in the case of certain international cartels (e.g. 
the ADM-lysine case). 
2.4.  The " Cost‐Based" Method 
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This method is based on the observation that changes in price should reflect changes in 
costs. The direct way to apply this method is to estimate the production costs by using the 
(accounting) information on firms involved in the cartel. In the lysine cartel case, prosecutors have 
introduced the confidential production and sales records of ADM as exhibits, and these documents 
are now publicly available. (See Connor 2001). 
But typically, academic researchers and economic experts do not have access to 
confidential documents of firms. In general, the overcharge is thus approximated by substracting a 
" reasonable margin"  from the actual cartel profit and dividing by the production volume. The 
reasonable margin should include not only the marginal production cost, but also other factors that 
causes the natural competition price to be larger than the marginal production cost. In particular, it 
should include opportunity costs, the risk premium and oligopoly mark-up when relevant. Failure 
to account for these would lead to overestimating the overcharge. 
2.5 "Econometric" Methods 
Econometric methods are not tied to a particular economic theory. This denomination 
gathers all methods using more or less sophisticated econometric models to assess the but-for price. 
Econometric methods can be used to simulate an oligopolistic competition (Cournot, Bertrand), to 
predict the Lerner index of market power or to estimate a demand and cost functions that account 
for dynamic market conditions. A simple example is given in Froeb, Koyak and Werden (1993): 
"To estimate conspiracy-free prices for the earlier periods, we first fit logarithms of frozen perch 
winning bid prices for the post-conspiracy period on the logarithms of fresh perch prices for the 
corresponding month and for the prior five months. These opportunity cost variables explain 
77.0% of the variance in frozen perch bid prices. This regression is then used to `backcast' 
predicted, conspiracy-free prices for the earlier periods."  
The potential of this method is illustrated by the following citation from Connor (2007): 
"Demand for animal feed rises in the winter months, which results in an increase in the derived 
demand for lysine in the fall of each year. Econometric methods are better equipped to handle 
seasonal shifters than the simple before-and-after method. Because collusion is best timed to begin 
when seasonal demand rises, ignoring this factor will lead to an overestimate of damages". This 
citation suggests that an econometric model if correctly built is more robust than simpler methods. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that econometric methods are always more reliable than 
other methods. In fact, building a good econometric model requires a careful selection of the 
relevant control variables to include. Also, the estimation results must be interpreted in light of the 
theory underlying the model. 
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3.  The Characteristics of the Connor Database 
In this section, we review some important characteristics of the Connor sample that one 
should be aware of before analyzing the data. 
3.1. The data are estimates rather than natural observations 
Economists devote time and resources to design overcharge estimation methods because 
cartels are usually not willing to communicate the true amount of their illegal profits. Due to this, 
overcharges are typically estimated rather than observed. The Connor sample consists of estimates 
previously computed and published by different analysts and researchers, and is therefore subject to 
model errors, estimation errors and sample selection. 
In fact, overcharge estimators typically build on existing economic theories or models. As 
any other estimator, overcharge estimators are subject to model error due to the fact that a model is 
necessarily a simplified representation of the world. Model errors often translate into misleading 
choice of estimation method, and hence creates estimation biases. An estimator is said to be robust 
to model error if it continues to measure with precision the parameter of interest when the model 
that has actually generated the data deviates to some extent from the theory used to derive the 
estimator. The robustness of an estimator to model error can be studied by making specific 
assumptions about the true data generating process. For example, linear regression model are 
estimated by OLS based on the assumption that the error term is independent of the regressors. To 
verify the robustness of the OLS estimators to this assumption, one may postulate a particular form 
of dependence between the error and the regressors, and then, study the properties of the previous 
estimators under this alternative assumption (See Hayashi (2000), page 188). As another example, 
suppose we want to determine the equilibrium mark-ups on a given market. The assumptions made 
about the type of interaction in which the players are involved strongly determines the nature of the 
equilibrium. If one assumes that the competition is pure and perfect, then the equilibrium mark-ups 
would be null. On the other hand, if one assumed an oligopolistic or monopolistic competition, then 
the mark-ups are allowed to be positive at equilibrium. 
To understand the estimation error as opposed to model error, suppose in the example 
above that the market model is correctly specified and the theoretical formula of the mark-up 
correctly derived within this model. To implement the model empirically, one needs to replace the 
unknown parameters involved in the mark-up formula by their random estimates. This causes the 
final mark-up estimator to be itself random. The difference between the mark-up estimate and the 
true unknown mark-up is an estimation error. This error does not vanish even if the model is 
correctly specified. For example, an estimator of the theoretical variance of a distribution is given 
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by the empirical variance of a random sample from this distribution. In this case, the estimation 
error may be defined as the root mean square error of the empirical variance. 
The sample selection refers to the extent to which the sample available for estimation is 
representative of the true population. A sample selection problem arises if observations that meet 
certain criteria are absent from the sample. In the Connor database, the sample selection problem 
takes the form of the publication bias. This type of selection stems from the fact that “…editorial 
reviewers have a substantial preference for studies with statistically significant results” (Hunter 
and Schmidt, 2004). The potential distortions that the publication bias can cause to observed 
sample of cartel overcharges is pointed out by the following citation from Ehmer and Rosati 
(2009): “If a researcher finds that a cartel had the effect of strongly increasing prices, the result is 
likely to be considered correct and worth publishing. However, if the analysis shows that the cartel 
had the effect of reducing prices, the conclusion is more likely to be discarded as unreliable, and 
the result not published”. In the Connor sample, the publication bias does not take the form of a 
systematic exclusion of zero overcharge estimates as they represent 7.23% of the sample. Rather, 
one can only suspect that the proportion of zeros would be higher if the actual overcharges were 
observed. Moreover, some of the zero estimates may be negative estimates that are rounded up to 
zero. 
In his answer to Ehmer and Rosati published in the same journal, Connor (2010a) mentions 
another type of sample selection: “It has long been believed that discovered cartels are more inept 
than cartels that remained hidden from antitrust authorities. This is what is meant by selection bias 
in cartel studies. And this kind of selection bias suggests that the overcharges of discovered cartels 
are systematically lower than overcharges of secret cartels”. This assertion of Connor is highly 
debatable. Indeed, if the probability of detection of a cartel is strictely positive, then a cartel cannot 
remain undiscovered forever. Since a cartel can be dissolved voluntarily or be victim of deviation 
by its members before being discovered, there is no compelling reason to expect that undiscovered 
cartels live longer than those discovered, and hence, are more likely of making larger cumulative 
profit. Moreover there is no reason a priori to suggest that long-lived cartels have higher yearly 
profits than short-lived ones. 
In summary, a sound treatement of potential model errors, estimation errors and sample 
selection is necessary in an empirical analysis of the Connor sample. 
3.2. Skewness, outliers and heterogeneity 
In the abstract of Connor (2010b), one reads: "the median long run overcharge for all types 
of cartels over all periods is 23.3%. [...] Cartel overcharges are negatively skewed, pushing the 
mean overcharge for all successful cartels to 50.4%". Actually, Connor means to say that the 
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overcharges are positively skewed, a large proportion of small overcharges coexisting with a small 
proportion of large overcharges. This small number of large overcharge estimates are influential 
observations that cause the mean computed on the whole sample not to be representative of the 
majority of cartels. In the Connor sample used in this paper, the average and median of the sample 
are respectively 45.5% and 23% for all cartels and 49.0% and 25.0% for cartels with stricly 
positive estimates. The difference between the mean and the median is due to the skewness of the 
distribution of the overcharge estimates. 
Figures 3 and 4 confirm that in the Connor sample, the large magnitude of the empirical 
mean is due to a few number of influential. Roughly 1% of overcharge estimates are larger than 
400% and 22.6% larger than or equal to 50%. Such overcharge levels would be quasi impossible 
under normal economic conditions. This suggests that these outliers should be treated carefully 
when using econometric methods that are sensitive to their presence. For example, it is well known 
that when using ordinary least squares, the presence of outliers in the sample significantly increases 
the likelihood of a misleading conclusion. 
Figure 3 
Overcharge estimates: Distribution skewed to the right. 
 Overcharges larger than 400% (1% of the sample) are not shown on this figure.  
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Figure 4 
Proportion of cartels with overcharge estimates smaller than y, 
where y is given by the vertical axis. 
  
 
US cartels with overcharge estimates larger than or equal to 50% represent 5.7% of the 
sample, while such EU cartels represent 8.8% of the sample. The mean overcharge estimate for 
these subsamples are respectively 126.1% and 113.7%. Also, the means for US and EU cartels with 
stricly positive overcharges lower than 50% are 19.7% and 19.2% respectively. Overall, the 
average positive overcharges are 42.0% for US cartels and 45,6% for EU cartels. 
A similar picture can be drawn by comparing older cartels (ante 1973) to more recent ones 
(post 1973). Indeed, the average overcharge estimates are 62.0%, 47.8% and 43.8% respectively 
for all cartels, US cartels and EU cartels before 1973, as compared to 38.9%, 33.6% and 41.9% 
respectively for more recent cartels. Although the overcharge estimates are potentially biased, they 
suggest that cartels may behave differently across countries and periods. See Table 1. 
Another source of heterogeneity one can think of is the domestic versus international 
criterion. Domestic cartels represent 46.79% of all cartels and have average overcharge estimate 
equal to 33.60%. On the other hand, the average overcharge estimate of international cartels is 
equal to 55.90%, which is about 12% higher than for domestic cartels. International cartels with 
overcharge estimates higher than 50% represent 16.25% of the sample. This means that 
international cartels represent more than two third of the category of cartels with overcharge 
estimate higher than 50%. The average overcharge estimate of international cartel is 135.68% on 
the subsample with estimates larger than 50%. However, this average is 5.63% higher for the 
corresponding domestic cartels. 
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Table 1 
Mean and median overcharge estimates (OE) per location and types of cartels.  
The prop.% are fractions of the total Connor sample (1120 cartels). 
 
All 
Cartels OE>0% 0%<OE<50%  OE≥50%
Cartels 
Before 
1973 
Cartels 
After 
1973 
All locations 
Mean 45.47 49.01 20.61 137.26 61.98 38.89
Median 23.00 25.00 18.38 74.00 29.00 21.40
prop. 100.00 92.77 70.18 22.59 28.50 71.50
US 
Mean 38.15 42.03 19.69 126.14 47.79 33.58
Median 20.50 23.50 17.50 70.20 30.50 16.80
prop. 30.00 27.23 21.52 5.71 9.64 20.36
EU 
Mean 42.65 45.57 19.19 113.65 43.83 41.86
Median 23.00 25.00 16.10 75.00 24.75 20.40
prop. 33.48 31.34 22.59 8.75 13.39 20.09
Domestic 
Mean 33.60 36.91 18.66 141.31 35.42 32.79
Median 17.05 19.00 16.45 71.00 20.50 16.45
prop. 46.79 42.59 36.25 6.34 14.46 32.32
International 
Mean 55.90 59.28 22.70 135.68 89.38 43.93
Median 30.00 31.88 22.00 74.45 37.00 27.50
prop. 53.21 50.18 33.93 16.25 14.02 39.20
 
 The heterogenous nature of the Connor sample raises serious agregation problems. In 
concrete terms, the average overcharge obtained for the whole sample is meaningful only if the 
conditions that determine the but-for price are the same across time and markets. These conditions 
are obviously subject to change, and we can therefore expect significant aggregation biases. The 
following citation from Levenstein and Suslow (2003) illustrates the danger of using one single 
number to summarize all overcharge data: "The reported price increases vary widely by industry 
and by source. At the low end, for example, we have a reported price increase of ten percent for the 
thermal fax paper cartel, which was formed as the industry was declining and lasted for less than a 
year. At the high end there is the stainless steel cartel, which reportedly almost doubled prices. 
This cartel lasted slightly more than one year (from January 1994 to March 1995) and involved six 
European steel companies." 
Thus, a carefull treatement of outliers and heterogeneity is necessary in empirical analyses 
of the Connor database. 
3.3. Reliability of the Estimation Methods 
In studying the overcharge, it is important to bear in mind that the observed time series of 
prices are resultant of several causes. For example, an inelastic demand may grant a firm with a 
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significant market power that translate into high mark-ups. Homogenous products may be 
perceived as differentiated by consumers due to the positioning of the product by the firm's 
advertisement policy. The product differentiation in turn can cause a previously pure competitive 
market to behave as an oligopolistic or a monopolistically competitive one. But typically, 
oligopolistic markets have margins over MC that are significantly above zero, as illustrated by the 
following citation from Morrison (1990): "The empirical results suggest that mark-ups in most U.S. 
manufacturing firms have increased over time, and tend to be countercyclical." In Morrison 
(1990), one further reads:"...Robert Hall [ref.], [...] reported both significant increasing returns 
and mark-ups of price over marginal cost in various U.S. industries. Hall also finds that economic 
profits are approximately normal, suggesting an industrial structure along the classic lines of 
monopolistic competition."  
The proper but-for price should thus be the one that characterizes the natural competition 
equilibrium for the targeted market. More precisely, the but-for price is equal to the marginal cost 
plus a margin over marginal cost. In pure and perfect competition, this margin is low and close to 
zero. Regarding the complexity of the accurate characterization of the but-for world, some methods 
that have been used in the literature to estimate the overcharge are strikingly simplistic (and 
probably grossly inadequate). Examples include: 
• Bolotova, Yuliya, John M. Connor, and Douglas Miller. The impact of Collusion on Price 
Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases, paper at the 3rd International 
Industrial Organization Conference, Atlanta, April 9, 2005. 
"We used extensions of traditional ARCH and GARCH models to examine the difference in 
the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution during collusion and the 
absence of it using prices from two recently discovered conspiracies, citric acid and lysine. 
According to our results, the citric acid conspiracy increased prices by 9 cents per pound 
relative to pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. The lysine conspiracy managed to raise 
prices by 25 cents per pound."  
However, reduced form models like ARCH and GARCH are designed to capture variations 
over time of the mean and variance of a stochastic process without necessarily explaining 
what determines these variations. For such models to be fully relevant for the analysis of 
cartel overcharges, they must explicitly control for other determinants like changes in 
supply and demand functions, cost functions, seasonalities in the price process, etc. 
• John M. Connor. The Global Lysine Price-Fixing Conspiracy of 1992-1995. Review of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn - Winter, 1997), pp. 412-427 
"But-for price is average of the time series of price over two non-conspiracy periods."  
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Caveat: Same drawbacks as the before-and-after method. This approach assumes that 
nothing else than a price-fixing conspiracy may generate an upward drift in prices. 
• John M. Kuhlman. Theoretical Issues in the Estimation of Damages in a Private Antitrust 
Action. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Apr., 1967), pp. 548-558.  
The author used the maximum of the price index before the conspiracy as but-for-price. 
The author argues that at worst, this approach will underestimate the overcharge. 
Unfortunately, it has the same drawbacks as the before-and-after method. The maximum 
price observed in the past may not be informative about the new state of the world. 
• Bosch, J. and E.W. Eckard. The Profitability of Price Fixing: Evidence from Stock-Market 
Reactions to Federal Indictments. Review of Economics and Statistics 73 (1991): 309-317.  
The authors assessed the monopoly profit losses from the market reaction to indictment 
announcements. They found the market reaction to be significant. However, what is 
measured by the authors is the market's assessment of the decrease in future payoffs 
following the cartel detection, which can be quite different from the actual overcharge.4 
• In the ADM-lysine case, the approach advocated by Connor in estimating the overcharge 
as well as what he considers as the effective conspiracy period remains an area of 
disagreement.  
For example, White (2001) wrote:"Connor [...] has claimed that the trebled damages to 
lysine purchasers were an order of magnitude larger [than the 45 million settlement 
proposed by ADM]. Crucial to Connor's conclusions are his assumptions as to the time 
period during which the conspiracy had an effect on prices and the but-for price that 
otherwise would have prevailed in the absence of the conspiracy. This paper will argue 
that Connor substantially over-estimated the period of the conspiracy and under-estimated 
the but-for price."  
In the following citation from Levenstein and Suslow (2002), White further expressed his 
doubts about the quality of the estimates of Connor:"White [...] argues that the lysine 
industry, absent cooperation, would not have operated as a perfectly competitive industry. 
It was a four-firm oligopoly that would have likely been able to engage in some form of 
implicit coordination if there had been no explicit meetings. Recognition of this possibility, 
White argues, causes us to " enter the world of oligopoly speculation." Perhaps ADM 
                                                            
4 Some investors may be valuing at a premium the stock of a company condemned for being involved in 
cartel conspiracy if their assessment of future expected profits more than compensate current losses. 
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would have operated as a dominant firm. Or, perhaps the firms would have adopted 
Cournot behavior. [...] He concludes that " though the conspiracy surely did have harmful 
effects on the purchasers of lysine, those effects were less extensive and less severe than 
was claimed."  
Connor (2000, Appendix Table A3) estimates the overcharge for the Lysine cartel (1992-
1995) using the before-and-after approach. Even accounting for seasonal shifts of the 
demand curve, his lowest estimate is $157.8 million dollars. Later on, he acknowledges 
that his estimates are exaggerated: "With the benefit of hindsight and a great deal more 
information, it appears now that the first $150 million estimate by the plaintiffs [Connor 
(2002)] was too high." 
The revision by Connor of his own estimates appears to be due to the influence of 
competing empirical results, especially Morse and Hyde (2000) who developed and tested 
a richly specified econometric model of the lysine industry using 1990-1995 monthly data. 
After estimating their model, Morse and Hyde found that the lysine cartel's overcharge was 
$71 million. Using a before-and-after method, Connor finally arrived at an estimate of 
about $80 million by revising his but-for price from $0.70 to $0.80. Connor (2002) wrote 
the following comment about the methodology of Morse and Hyde: "Morse and Hyde 
(2000) managed to incorporate a fairly complete list of determinants of lysine demand: the 
number of hogs needed by U.S. slaughter houses, red meat and poultry export demand, the 
price of a complement and a substitute (the shadow price discussed above), and seasonality 
of lysine demand. On the supply side, an equation related ADM's U.S. production to the 
cost of three principal inputs: dextrose, other variable costs of manufacture, and capital. 
Both of these equations fitted the five years of data quite well, and the signs were the ones 
predicted by economic reasoning. Finally, an innovative feature of the model is an 
equation that permits the researcher to measure the degree of competitiveness 
("conjectural variations" ) between ADM and its four rivals."  
In the following citation, Connor (1998) acknowledged that the accurate measurement of 
the overcharge is a complex task that requires the simultaneous control of several factors: 
"Overcharge estimates are sensitive to a number of assumptions, most notably the " but-for" price--
-the market price that would have been observed had there been no cartel. Perhaps $0.60/lb. is too 
low a but-for price. [...]. However, about 18 months after the conspiracy ended, spot transactions 
prices had drifted only down to $0.67 or $0.68/lb., so the post-cartel period prices may hint that 
production costs had risen or that tacit collusion was being observed in 1997. Thus, the but-for 
price could have been $0.64/lb to $0.68/lb. At $0.68, the overcharges would be reduced to a bit 
over half of the estimates made previously."  
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In the next section, we review some problems that are not tied to the reliability of the 
computation methods, but instead to wrong interpretations of possibly well computed estimates. 
3.4. Misinterpretation of previous results 
The mark-up estimates of Morrison (1990, 1993) are converted into overcharges in Connor 
(2010b) while Morrison herself attributed these mark-ups to monopolistic competition. 
Unfortunately, these are not the only results from previous studies that have been wrongly 
interpreted as cartel overcharges by Connor. 
For example, Bhuhan and Lopez (1997) estimated a system of demand, from which 
estimates of Lerner indices are deduced. They found firms operating in the food and tobacco 
industries to have oligopolistic market powers. They never claimed that their results provided any 
kind of proof that the industry was cartelized. However, the Lerner indices estimates of Bhuhan 
and Lopez have been converted into overcharges in Connor (2010b). 
Barnett et al. (1995) estimated a model of oligopoly price behavior and studied the impact 
of US state level and federal taxes on cigarette consumption. They estimated various elasticities 
and conjectural variations than can be used to approximate oligopoly mark-ups. They never 
claimed that these mark-ups was due to overt collusion. However, the estimates of Barnett et al. 
have been converted into overcharges in Connor (2010b). 
 Suslow (1986) specified and estimated an econometric model of the aluminum industry 
between World War I and World War II. The study concluded that Alcoa had a substantial market 
power. According to the author: "Over the sample period Alcoa was not directly involved in the 
cartel, but there seemed to be implicit reciprocal agreements between Alcoa and the cartel against 
exporting into each other's territory". Connor (2010) is much more affirmative (in appendix): 
"[Suslow (1986) is a study] that measures the U.S. market power of Alcoa during three episodes 
when it was a monopolist in the U.S. market (1923-1940) partly because of agreements with 
European producers that limited imports" . 
Christie and Schultz (1994) is a study aimed at explaining the lack of odd-eighth quotes for 
the majority of NASDAQ stocks and raised the question as to whether NASDAQ dealers implicitly 
collude to maintain wide bid-ask spreads. They observed that odd-eighth quotes represented close 
to 50% of the price fractions for 5 NASDAQ firms whose market makers ceased using odd eighths 
in 1991. More importantly, they concluded that their “data do not provide direct evidence of tacit 
collusion among NASDAQ market makers”. In reference to this paper, Connor (2010b) reported an 
overcharge of 50%. 
21 
 
Runar (1989) observed that the Swedish pulpwood market is one of imperfect competition 
that can be modeled as a monopsony. He then undertook a study to estimate the effects on prices 
and quantities by going from an imperfect to a competitive pulpwood market. Connor (2010b) 
reported overcharges of 10% and 25% for the Swedish pulpwood and sawtimber markets 
respectively. However, the author reported results of a loss of approximately 23% of the value of 
all pulpwood sales and 10% of the value of total roundwood sales and further stated that he could 
not refute his assumption of monopsony in the pulpwood market. 
The list of shortfalls drawn up above is non exhaustive. Furthermore, a significant 
proportion of the overcharge estimates used in Connor (2010b) are obtained from the conversion of 
Lerner indices into overcharges. Below, we illustrate the danger of converting a Lerner index into 
an overcharge estimate by ignoring the presence of competitive mark-ups. 
3.5. Misuses of the Lerner Index 
An overcharge calculation approach based on the Lerner index can fall within the family of 
econometric methods or cost-based methods depending on how this index is estimated. The Lerner 
index of market power is defined as: 
L ൌ ୮ିୡ
୮
  (3) 
where ݌ is the market price and ܿ is the marginal cost (MC). In a perfectly competitive market, 
݌ ൌ ܿ so that ܮ ൌ 0. 
If the condition that would prevail in the absence of cartels is perfect competition, then the 
but-for price is given by ݌ ൌ ܿ. The Lerner index for the cartelized market is then given by: 
L ൌ ୮෥ିୡ
୮෥
  (4) 
and the true overcharge is: 
δ ൌ ୮
෥ି୮
୮
ൌ ୮
෥ିୡ
ୡ
 ֞ δ ൌ L
ଵିL
 (5) 
where ݌ ൌ ܿ is the but-for price in this case. Hence the formula above permits to retrieve the 
overcharge from the Lerner index if the but-for world is assumed to be characterized by pure and 
perfect competition. 
In a natural competition (real life) context, the price is in general equal to the MC (ܿ) plus a 
margin over MC (݉). The but-for price is then given by ݌ ൌ ܿ ൅݉. The Lerner index in the 
cartelized market is: 
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L ؠ ୮
෥ିୡ
୮෥
ൌ ୫
෥
ୡା୫෥
 (6) 
where ݌෤ ൌ ܿ ൅ ෥݉  is the price in the cartelized market. Hence the (true) overcharge by the cartel 
over the natural competition price becomes: 
δ ؠ ୮෥ି୮
୮
ൌ ୫෥ି୫
ୡା୫
 (7) 
However, the overcharge that would be inferred from the Lerner index (wrongly) assuming perfect 
competition as benchmark is: 
δ෨ ؠ L
ଵିL
ൌ ୫
෥
ୡ
ൌ δ ൅ ୫
ୡ
ሺδ ൅ 1ሻ (8) 
Typically, oligopolistic competition mark-ups range between 10% and 30%, and 
sometimes more (Morrison 1990, 1993). If the true overcharge is ߜ ൌ 10% and ௠
௖
ൌ 20%, then the 
Lerner index delivers the biased estimate ߜሚ ൌ 32%, i.e. more than three times the true value. Note 
that the bias is increasing in both the true ߜ and the natural competition mark-up to marginal cost 
ratio ௠
௖
. For example, ߜ ൌ 20% and ௠
௖
ൌ 20% leads to the biased estimate ߜሚ ൌ 44%. Now assume 
that the true overcharge is half of previous one (ߜ ൌ 10%) and that ௠
௖
ൌ 30%. Then the overcharge 
inferred from the Lerner index is ߜሚ ൌ 43%, i.e. almost the same value as in the previous example 
where the true overcharge is higher. 
If the unit cost ܿ is small, the bias ௠
௖
ሺߜ ൅ 1ሻ will tend to be large, no matter how small the 
true ߜ is. This is illustrated by the following table. 
Table 2 
Pitfall in the Conversion a Lerner Index Into an Overcharge Estimate. 
Constant overcharge, constant margin, and bias increasing as the marginal cost decreases.  
   Parameters   Values  
 ߜ   10%   10%   10%   10%   10%  
݉   0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02  
c   0.20   0.1625   0.1250   0.0875   0.05  
௠
௖
   10%   12.3 %   16%   22.9%   40%  
Bias ൌ ୫
ୡ
ሺδ ൅ 1ሻ   11%   14%   18%   25%   44%  
ߜሚ ൌ ߜ ൅ ܤ݅ܽݏ   21%   24%   28%   35%   54%  
B୧ୟୱ
ஔ
  52.4%   58.3%   64.3%   71. 4%   81. 5%  
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In Connor (2006, Table 12, 12A, 12B), the overcharges are inferred from Lerner indices 
previously estimated by Bernheim (2002).5 The average overcharge inferred by Connor is above 
40%, a high percentage potentially attribuable to the propensity of the calculation method used to 
overstate the true illegal profit. In the following citation, Connor (2007) seems to acknowledge that 
the but-for price should reflect the true conditions prevailing before the cartel formation: "A pre-
cartel price is often presumed in legal settings to be the competitive price. " Cartel members . . . 
enjoy no presumption that they already had market power before the illegal act was committed" 
(Hovenkamp, 1998:660). However, even if a pre-cartel period was arguably one of oligopolistic 
tacit pricing conduct, the pre-cartel price is still a reasonable benchmark so long as the 
competitive determinants of pricing conduct did not change when the cartel was formed." Also, in 
Footnote 3, page 5 of Connor (2010b) it is mentioned that: "...The benchmark may be the purely 
competitive price, or it may be a somewhat higher price generated by legal tacit collusion by 
companies in an oligopolistic industry." However, Footnote 47 on page 16 casts some doubt on 
how he actually interprets the overcharges estimated from the Lerner index in subsequent analyses: 
"...The Lerner Index is the same as the overcharge, except that it is measured by dividing [the 
difference between] the market price [and the marginal cost] by the monopoly price instead of the 
competitive price". 
We have illustrated the bias tied to methodologies based on the Lerner index. But each 
estimation methodology is susceptible of introducing a particular type of bias. One way to size up 
the bias contaminating overcharge estimates is to build an econometric meta-analysis model of 
overcharges. The goals of such a meta-analysis and the relevant models to use are discussed in the 
next section. 
4.  A Meta­Analysis to Bias­Correct Overcharge Estimates 
As explained in Connor and Bolotova (2006), a meta-analysis may be defined as an 
"analysis of analyses". It is often used in experimental fields to summarize the findings of studies in 
a particular literature. But increasingly, meta-analyses are used to verify if the conditions of an 
experiment impact the results. As pointed out by Frank Schmidt in the preface to the second edition 
of his book coauthored with John Hunter, “The avowed purpose of other methods of meta-analysis 
is to describe and summarize the results of studies in a research literature (Rubin, 1990). [...] In 
our view, the purpose of meta-analysis is to estimate what the results would have been had all the 
studies been conducted without methodological limitations and flaws”. The meta-analysis 
conducted in this section is consistent with the view of Hunter and Schmidt (2004). 
                                                            
5 As quoted by Connor. See also Kovacic et alii (2005). 
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In their meta-analysis, Connor and Bolotova (2006) used a linear regression to analyze the 
relationship between cartel overcharge estimates on one hand and the characteristics of cartels, the 
estimation methods and publication sources of the estimates on the other hand. They found that the 
characteristics of the cartel explain the variability of overcharge estimates to a greater extent than 
the estimation methods and sources of publication. We argue that this analysis is incomplete, as it 
fails to point out that the portion of overcharge estimates that is “explained” by subjective factors 
like the estimation method or the source of publication is an estimation bias. Moreover, outliers are 
included in their regression analysis that cause their result to lack robustness. These points are 
made clearer below. 
4.1.  True Overcharge vs. Estimation Bias 
It is reasonable to expect that the true overcharge values depend on the conspiracy period, 
the duration of the cartel, the characteristics of the firm involved in the collusion and other similar 
factors. However, we do not observe the true overcharge. Instead, we observe an estimate which is 
equal to the actual overcharge plus a bias, positive or negative. Hence in addition to factors that 
affect the true overcharge, we can arguably expect the estimate to be sensitive to subjective factors 
that may cause bias, namely the estimation method, the source of publication and other factors 
“posterior” to the occurrence of the conspiracy period. 
Formally, the bias is defined as the influence of factors that affect the overcharge estimates, 
but not the true overcharge values themselves. Indeed, the true overcharge is already empocketed 
by the cartel by the time the estimation is being made. Hence the true overcharge should not 
depend on the estimation method nor on the source of publication. To bias-correct the estimates, 
one can build and estimate a meta-analysis model that relates overcharge estimates to both types of 
factors. Examples of variables capable of explaining the size of actual overcharges include the 
duration of the cartel, its organizational characteristics, its scope (domestic vs. international), the 
conspiracy period, the industry characteristics (sector, concentration, etc), the elasticity of demand, 
etc. On the other hand, example of variables that may explain the size of the estimation bias are the 
estimation method, the publication source, the presumption of collusion when computing the 
estimator, etc.  
Unfortunately, the data set available for our analysis does not include variables that 
describe the industry characteristics or the elasticity of demand. The type of analysis conducted 
below could thus be improved if and when more data on cartels become available.6 
 
                                                            
6 If measures of market concentration were available, these could have been used as explanatory variables 
although not directly convertible into cartel overcharge. 
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4.2. A Linear Meta‐Regression Analysis of Cartel Overcharges 
By definition, the true overcharge ߠ௜ depends only on variables Y that impact its size:  
θ୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧Ԅ ൅ u୧ (9) 
where ݑ௜ is an error term such that Eሺu୧ሻ ൌ Eሺu୧Y୧ሻ ൌ 0.  
We have seen previously that converting a Lerner index into an overcharge generates a 
multiplicative bias. Hence in general, we can expect the estimated overcharge to take the following 
form: 
X୧ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ Z୧λሻθ୧ (10) 
where ௜ܺ is the overcharge estimate from study ݅, ܼ௜ is the set of variables that explain the size of 
the bias. This amounts to say that the overcharge is inflated or deflated by a factor ܼ௜ߣ, i.e. a linear 
combination of the ܼ variables. By substituting for ߠ௜ into the expression of ௜ܺ, we obtain: 
X୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅ Z୧γ ൅ Y୧Z୧δ ൅ ε୧ (11) 
where: 
 ߚ ൌ ߙ߶, 
 ߛ ൌ ߙߣ, 
 ߜ ൌ ߣ߶, 
 ߝ௜ ൌ ሺܼ௜ߣ ൅ 1ሻݑ௜, 
௜ܻܼ௜ is the set of interaction variables and ߝ௜ is an error term. This suggests that ߝ௜ is 
heteroscedastic, but we ignore this in the sequel.7 
Consider, for example, the interaction variable obtained by multiplying the duration by the 
yardstick dummy variable. The estimated coefficient for that variable gives the additional bias 
induced by the yardstick method per unit duration. Also, the coefficient of the interaction between 
the yardstick dummy variable and the dummy of a given cartel characteristic (e.g: domestic vs. 
international) gives the additional bias of the yardstick method when used to estimate the 
overcharge of cartels with this particular characteristic. But note that the indicator variable obtained 
by interacting two dummies can be identically null (if the intersection between the two subsamples 
                                                            
7 When heteroscedasticity is ignored, the coefficients estimated by OLS are consistent, but their standard 
error tends to be underestimated. At worst, this may lead to conclude that a coefficient is significant while it 
is actually not. In our analysis, all estimated coefficients are used to bias-correct the overcharge estimates, 
regardless of whether they are significant or not. 
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identified by these dummies is empty) or identical to an existing variable. Such interaction 
variables are not relevant and must be discarded. Furthermore, if both the number of ܻ and ܼ 
variables are moderately large, this results in a huge number of interaction variables that cause the 
model to lack parsimony. 
To mitigate these difficulties, we use the indicators of clusters identified in the previous 
section as a summary of the ܻ variables, and only these indicators are interacted with the ܼ 
variables. The model we estimate is: 
X୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅ ∑  ସ୩ୀଵ Z.,୧
ሺ୩ሻγ୩ ൅ ε୧ (12) 
where Z.,୧
ሺ୩ሻ ൌ ቀܼଵ,௜
ሺ௞ሻ, … , ܼ௄,௜
ሺ௞ሻቁ, ௝ܼ,௜
ሺ௞ሻ being the realization of the interaction variable ௝ܼ
ሺ௞ሻ for cartel i. 
This interaction variable is obtained by multiplying the variable ௝ܼ by the indicator of cluster k. 
Hence ௝ܼ,௜
ሺ௞ሻ ൌ ௝ܼ,௜ if the cartel i belongs to cluster k, and ௝ܼ,௜
ሺ௞ሻ ൌ 0 otherwise. Note that this 
amounts to assuming that the parameters of the bias-correction factors vary across clusters. 
4.3.  A Log‐linear Meta‐Regression Analysis of Cartel Overcharges 
Alternatively to the linear model (12), we can also consider the log-linear specification: 
logX୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅ ∑  ସ୩ୀଵ Z୧
ሺ୩ሻγ୩ ൅ ε୧ (13) 
This model implies that: 
X୧ ൌ expሺα ൅ Y୧β ൅ ε୧ሻexp ቀ∑  ସ୩ୀଵ Z୧
ሺ୩ሻγ୩ቁ (14) 
We see that if the true overcharge is given by ߠ௜ ൌ expሺߙ ൅ ௜ܻߚ ൅ ߝ௜ሻ, then the bias is 
multiplicative and given by: 
Biasሺθ୧ሻ ؠ X୧ െ θ୧ (15) 
  ൌ expሺα ൅ Y୧β ൅ ε୧ሻ ቂexp ቀ∑  ସ୩ୀଵ Z୧
ሺ୩ሻγ୩ቁ െ 1ቃ 
This formula allows the bias to be positive, null or negative depending on whether 
exp ቀ∑  ସ௞ୀଵ ܼ௜
ሺ௞ሻߛ௞ቁ is larger than, equal to or smaller than unity. 
Another argument in favor of the log-linear specification is that the distribution of the 
logarithm of estimated overcharges is close to symmetry and less subject to distorsion caused by 
extreme values, as showed in the following figure. This happens because the log-transformation 
27 
 
shifts part of the right skewness into left skewness. In the sequel, the estimation results of the two 
model specifications are compared. 
Figure 7 
Log of overcharge estimates that are above zero and below 400% (91.6% of the sample).  
 
 
4.4.  An Example of Meta‐Analysis: Connor and Bolotova (2006) 
Connor and Bolotova (2006) performed a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates in 
which they used the following variables: 
Yଵ: Duration takes value 1 if duration is less than 5 years; 2 if duration is from 6 to 10  
years; 3 if duration is from 11 to 15 years; 4 if duration iis 16 years or more. 
Yଶ: Domestic cartel: 1 = Yes; 0 = No. 
Yଷ: Bid rigging: 1 = Yes; 0 = No. 
Yସ: Found guilty or pleads guilty: 1 = yes; 0 = No. 
Yହ: Geographic market (dummies for US, EU, ASIA, ROW including Latin America,  
       WORLD cartels which cannot be associated to a head region) 
Y଺: Antitrust law regime (dummies for P1: 1770-1890, P2: 1891-1919, P3: 1920- 
       1945,   P4: 1945-1973, P5: 1974-1990, P6: 1991-2004). 
ܼଵ: Overcharge estimation method (dummies for Price before conspiracy, Price war,  
       Price after conspiracy, Yardstick, Cost based or normal profit, Econometric 
       modeling, Historical case study with no method specified, Other) 
ܼଶ: Type of publication (dummies for Peer reviewed journal, Chapters inbook, Monograph 
or books, Government report, Court or antitrust authority source, Working paper, 
Speech or conference presentation) 
 
With this notation, the model estimated by Connor and Bolotova (2006) is: 
X୧ ൌ α ൅ ∑  ୧ Y୧β୧ ൅ ∑  ୧ Z୧γ ൅ ε୧ (16) 
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They estimated different restrictions of the full model. Here we consider the estimation results for 
the full model (column [7] of Table 6 in their paper). 
Connor and Bolotova (2006) found that the estimated overcharge is positively related to 
the duration and does not depend on whether the firm is "guilty" or not. It is lower for domestic 
cartels and for cartels that have operated in the EU. Contrary to what is claimed in Cohen and 
Scheffman (1989), they found that the overcharge is not higher nor lower for bid-rigging cases. 
Also, the size of overcharges has declined over time. The authors attribute this to the increased 
severity of antitrust regulation. However, this effect is difficult to distinguish from the one of 
increased competition and free trade. 
Interestingly, the ܼ variables also have significant impacts on overcharge estimates. The 
yardstick method produces estimates that are on average more than 10% higher than the "after the 
conspiracy" method. Otherwise, there are no significant differences between the other methods.8 
Using the "monograph or book" as reference for the type of publication, the regression of Connor 
and Bolotova predicted that Government reports underestimate the overcharge by 22% while court 
reports overestimate the overcharge by 15%. Otherwise, they observed no significant differences 
between the effects of other sources of publication. 
The fact that the ܼ variables show significant effects in the regression makes the 23.3% 
median overcharge and the 50.4% average overcharge of Connor (2010b) difficult to interpret as 
indicators that meaningfully describe the behavior of "all types of cartels over all periods of time" . 
Therefore the interpretation by Connor and Bolotova (2006) of their own meta-analysis results is 
incomplete, partly because they fail to mention that the ܼ variables capture biases in the overcharge 
estimates, but mainly because they confuse these estimates with true unobserved overcharges. 
Although the regression of Connor and Bolotova (2006) may lack robustness because of the 
inclusion of outliers, it confirms that overcharge estimates are susceptible of being biased.  
 After estimating the meta-analysis model, unbiased overcharge estimates may be obtained 
by eliminating the estimated influence of bias factors from initial estimates. Before turning to 
discuss that point in detail in Section 7, we explain below the cares that must be taken when 
working with the Connor database.  
 
 
 
                                                            
8 A restricted model that excludes all the ܻ variables predicts that the "price war" method produces estimates 
that are on average more than 15% higher than the "after the conspiracy" method. 
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5.  Heterogeneity, Outliers and Sample Selection 
We mentionned previously the presence of influential observations in the sample used by 
Connor (2010b). Unfortunately, some of these observations are included in the sample used for the 
meta-analysis of Connor and Bolotova (2006). The danger of including outliers in a regression 
analysis is expressed in the following citation from Hunter and Schmidt (2004, page 196): “The use 
of least squares statistical methods [...] is based on the assumption that the data contain no 
aberrant values (i.e. outliers). When this assumption does not hold, the statistically optimal 
properties (efficiency and unbiasedness) of least squares estimates disappear. Under these 
circumstances, least squares estimates become very inaccurate because of their extreme sensitivity 
to outliers (Huber, 1980; Tukey, 1960; see also Barnett and Lewis, 1978; Grubbs, 1969).” 
In the first subsection, we illustrate the scope of the distorsion that heterogeneity in general 
and influential observations in particular can cause in a regression analysis. By definition, outliers 
represent a small number of observations and thus may be discarded from OLS regressions. But 
hidden forms of heterogeneity affecting a relatively large number of observations need a more 
careful treatment. In the second subsection, we use a K-means analysis to approximate 
semiparametrically the heterogeneity of cartels described by the data. The estimated heterogeneity 
structure is then used in subsequent analysis to improve the bias-correction of cartel overcharges. 
In the third subsection, we show how to correct the sample selection problem raised by the 
exclusion of outliers. 
5.1  The Impact of Influential Observations on a Linear Regression 
The presence of influential observations in a sample can be due to the fat-tailedness of the 
distribution that generates the data. For example, stable distributions display frequent extreme 
values compared to normal distributions. Influential observations can also be due to heterogeneity 
in the sample. For example, consider observations that are generated by two normal distributions, 
one with mean ߤଵ and variance ߪଶ, and the other with mean ߤଶ and variance ߪଶ. Let ߨଵ ൌ 1 െ ߝ be 
the probability that an arbitrary observation comes from the first distribution and ߨଶ ൌ ߝ denote the 
complementary probability. For quite small ߝ, the number of observations coming from the second 
distribution can be as small as one in a large sample. 
For illustration and without loss of generality, assume that we have a sample with only the 
first observation coming from the second distribution, and that an econometrician who ignores the 
heterogeneity runs the following regression: 
௜ܺ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߝ௜  (17) 
Then the OLS estimator of ߙ is the sample mean: 
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αෝ ൌ ଵ
N
∑  N୧ୀଵ X୧  (18) 
To measure the impact of the unique observation generated by the second distritrution, we 
write: 
ߙො ൌ ଵ
ே ଵܺ
൅ ேିଵ
ே
ቀ ଵ
ேିଵ
∑  ே௜ୀଶ ௜ܺቁ  (19) 
The expectation of ߙො is: 
ܧሺߙොሻ ൌ ଵ
ே
ߤଶ ൅
ேିଵ
ே
ߤଵ  (20) 
Firstly, we see that ܧሺߙොሻ lies strictly between ߤଵ and ߤଶ so that ߙො is biased for both ߤଵ and ߤଶ. 
Second, assuming that ߤଶ ൌ ܭߤଵ for quite large ܭ, we have: 
ܧሺߙොሻ ൌ ௄ାேିଵ
ே
ߤଵ  (21) 
If the aim of the study is to draw conclusions that are applicable to the majority of the population, 
then the econometrician should design an estimator that targets ߤଵ as precisely as possible. But the 
bias of ߙො for ߤଵ is given by: 
ܧሺߙොሻ െ ߤଵ ൌ
௄ିଵ
ே
ߤଵ  (22) 
This bias is increasing in both ܭ and ߤଵ and can be susbtantial in many cases of practical interest. 
Such is the problem raised by the presence of infrequent influential observations in a sample. 
With a bit more complication, similar analytical results can be showed to hold for 
estimated coefficients of a regression. For illustration purpose, let us consider an example where a 
variable y is linked to a variable x through the relation: 
ݕ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚݔ ൅ ݑ  
Where u is a Gaussian error with mean 0 and variance 0.25, α=1 and β=2. We simulate a sample of 
50 independent observations from this model by assuming that x is a standard normal random 
variables. We then use the simulated sample to infer the intercept and slope of the model by OLS, 
as if they where unknown. 
Next, we consider the previous sample and add +20 to the largest realization of y, leaving 
the corresponding x unchanged. One may think that the outlier hence generated is exagerated. 
However, in the database that is at our disposal, the largest overcharge estimate is equal to 1800, 
which amounts to 40 times the unconditional average overcharge estimate and 37 times the average 
of strictly positive overcharge estimates. 
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Again, we repeat the previous excercise by adding +20 to the observation of y that is 
immediately smaller than the previous outlier. This yields a new sample that contains two outliers. 
We use the three samples to estimate the intercept and slope of the linear model by OLS. The 
results are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. 
OLS regression results with 0, 1 and 2 outliers in a sample of 50 observations.  
Simulation results based on 1000 Monte Carlo replications. 
  Coefficient Mean Std. Dev. IC5 IC95 
No outlier α 0.999 0.071 0.884 1.118 
β 2.001 0.073 1.886 2.120 
One outlier α 1.393 0.150 1.151 1.634 
β 2.937 0.191 2.657 3.270 
Two outliers α 1.789 0.254 1.362 2.207 
β 3.713 0.287 3.285 4.216 
 
 This example shows that the presence of one or two outliers in a sample of 50 observations 
can distort OLS results. When outliers are present, the OLS estimator are biased, their standard 
errors increase and the confidence intervals are misleading about the true value of the parameters. 
Indeed, the confidence intervals for α and β in Table 3 do not even contain the true values even 
with only one outlier. The relative bias of the estimator of β (the bias divided by the true value of 
the parameter) amounts to 47% when there is one outlier and 86% when there are two outliers. And 
similarly for the estimator of α. Hence if y were an overcharge and x an explanatory variable (e.g. 
duration of cartels), it would be wise to discard the outliers from the sample if one wish to draw 
conclusions that meaningfully describe the representative cartel. 
As an empirical illustration, we compute the empirical mean of the strictly positive 
overcharge estimates in the Connor sample by sequentially leaving the largest observation out.9 
The result is shown on Figure 5. The empirical mean drops from 50% to approximately 32% when 
the 5% most influential observations are removed from the sample, and to approximately 22% 
when the 20% most influential observations are left out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9 Only one observation is left out at each step. 
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Figure 5 
Impact of influential observations on the sample mean 
 
In our empirical applications, we discard overcharge estimates that are larger than 
or equal to 50% from OLS regressions, which represents the 22,6% most influential 
observations in the sample. Zero overcharge estimates are also discarded from the meta-analysis 
for four reasons. First, these estimates represent 7.23% of the sample, suggesting that the 
probability of an overcharge estimate taking exactly the value zero is not equal to zero. 
Technically, this mean that in a regression analysis of the whole universe of overcharge estimates, 
the distribution of the error term should be of truncated type.10 Second, the preferred empirical 
framework consists of regressing log-overcharge estimates on a number of explanatory variables. 
Hence zero overcharge estimates must be discarded for technical reasons (log-of-zero problem). 
Third, there are reasons to expect that the true underlying overcharge estimates are not all exactly 
equal to zero.11 And fourth, even if the zero overcharge estimates that are present in the sample are 
unbiased, their empirical proportion is highly susceptible to be distorted by the publication bias. 
By excluding the zeros and positive outliers, we do not mean to say that overcharges taking 
these values do not exist in real life. Instead, zeros and positive outliers are excluded from OLS 
regressIons because their inclusion would jeopardize the accuracy and generality of the results.12 
                                                            
10 This is not to say that overcharge data are truncated at zero. What is meant is that a truncated distribution is 
needed to fit the portion of the sample consisting of strictly positive overcharges, given that the true 
distribution admits a mass of probability at zero. 
11 In practice, zero overcharge estimates may arise either from censoring (unreported negative estimates that 
are set to zero) or from a mass of probability (a strictly positive proportion of unsuccessful cartels). A zero 
overcharge estimate belonging to the first category is likely to be biased. An example of a negative estimate 
found by authors and not used is discussed by Finkelstein and Levenbach (1983). 
12 Tukey (1960) and Huber (1980) recommend deletion of the largest 5% and the smallest 5% values. We 
may have considered winsorizing the data, which consists of replacing observations that are larger than the 
80th percentile by that percentile. However, this would replace the original bias in the data by a bias of our 
own. Our goal is to link the true bias in the overcharge to its true potential causes (namely, the publication 
source and the calculation method). Moreover, the distortion introduced by the winsorization would be less 
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Indeed, this makes the sample selection problem more severe rather than solving it. But Heckman 
(1979) designed a methodology to eliminate the bias that this type of sample selection raises; we 
present and use this methodology in Section 6.3. 
5.2.  A K‐means Analysis of Overcharge Data 
Removing overcharge estimates that are equal to zero and those that are larger than or 
equal to 50% reduces the heterogeneity problem raised above, but may not provide a complete 
solution. We control for the residual heterogenity in the remainder of the sample by mean of a K-
means analysis, which is a nonparametric cluster analysis that is aimed at partitioning a sample of 
observations into ܭ groups, by minimizing the within groups heterogeneity between observations 
while maximizing the between groups heterogeneity. The number of groups ܭ and the criterion 
used to measure the heterogeneity are chosen by the researcher. For ease of expositions, suppose 
we want to partition a sample ሺݔଵ, . . . , ݔ௡ሻ into K groups and use the Euclidian norm of the 
difference between two observations as the measure of heterogeneity. A typical K-means algorithm 
starts by a random draw of K arbitrary points ሺܿଵ, . . . , ܿ௄ሻ from the sample, called the centroids. 
At the first step of the algorithm, each observation is allocated to the centroid to which it 
ressembles the most: 
x୧ א G୩ ֞ k ൌ argmin
ଵஸ୪ஸK
ሼԡx୧ െ c୪ԡଶሽ, i ൌ 1, . . . , n   ሺ23ሻ 
This step partitions the sample ሺݔଵ, . . . , ݔ௡ሻ into K initial groups ܩଵ, . . . , ܩ௄. At the Second step of 
the algorithm, one replaces the previous centroids by the average of the groups, that is: 
c୩ ՚
ଵ
୬ౡ
∑  ୶౟אGౡ x୧, k ൌ 1,2, . . . , K  ሺ24ሻ 
where ݊௞ is the number of observations in the group ܩ௞. Note that the new centroids are now 
fictitious observations. The third step of the algorithm consists of iterating the previous two steps 
until convergence, i.e. until the groups become stable. At the convergence of the algorithm, we 
obtain a decomposition of the original sample into K groups such that the within group variance is 
minimized. This is equivalent to maximizing the between group variance, as the sum of the within 
and between group variance gives the total variance. 
We use the K-means analysis described above to segregate our sample of alleged cartels 
into four clusters. Variables included in the analysis are overcharge estimates and variables that 
may affect the size of the true overcharge (i.e. the ܻ variables of the meta-analysis of Connor and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pronounced if the bias where monotonically increasing in the overcharge, that is, if the bias in a 55% 
overcharge is higher than the bias in a 50% overcharge. Clearly, this may not be the case if the two 
overcharges are calculated using different methods. 
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Bolotova). We find that the ranges of overcharge estimates across clusters do not overlap in the 
multidimensional K-means analysis, which reflects the fact that heterogeneity in the sample mainly 
comes from the distribution of overcharge estimates.13 The lower cluster is comprised of 215 
cartels with overcharge estimates varying from 0.1% to 11.1%. The moderately low cluster gathers 
234 cartels with overcharge estimates lying between 11.4% to 21.6%. The moderately high cluster 
contains 197 overcharge estimates lying between 21.7% and 33.7%. Finally, at the very high end, 
we have 140 cartels whose overcharges are estimated to lie between 33.9% to 49.9%. In the next 
section, this decomposition of the sample into clusters is exploited in our bias-correction scheme of 
overcharge estimates. 
Figure 6 
Separation of the overcharge estimates into homogenous clusters. 
(The ranges of overcharge estimates do not overlap)  
 
5.3.  Controlling for the Sample Selection Bias 
Leaving roughly 30% of cartels out of the sample14 used for our OLS regressions may 
cause some of our conclusions to loose generality. This would be true even if we know that 
including these cartels deteriorates the results of the analysis. The absence or deletion of a non 
negligible proportion of observations from a study raises a sample selection problem well 
documented in econometrics.15 In the present case, the deletion of observations (with original 
                                                            
13 We find that the composition of clusters with multidimensinal centroids does not change very much when 
only overcharge estimates are used to perform the analysis. For instance, when only overcharge estimates are 
used in the analysis, the first cluster ranges from 0.1% to 12.5% overcharge estimates. 
14 In total, 22.59% of overcharge estimates larger than or equal to 50% and 7.23% of zero overcharge 
estimates. 
15 An interesting example cited in Heckman (1979) arises from the self-selection of women who choose to 
work outside the household. Indeed, the salary is observable only for women whose market wage exceeds the 
implicit home wage obtained when they do not work at all. Hence in studying the gender salary gap, it is 
important to bear in mind that some women choose deliberately not to work because they are not sufficiently 
motivated to do so (here the motivation is measured in monetary terms). The sample is necessarily truncated 
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overcharge estimates of 0% and of ≥50%) for estimation purposes is done to avoid obtaining 
distorted results due to outliers.16 
In models that are linear in the parameters, Heckman (1979) shows that the bias induced by 
sample selection on regression coefficients is a missing regressor problem. To fix ideas, let us 
assume there exists a latent index X୧כ indicating the quality of the data.
17 In the present context, the 
quality of an observation is defined in relation with its contribution to the quality of the estimation 
results. In concrete terms, large positive overcharge estimates are considered poor quality data, not 
necessarily because they are measured with more bias than other observations, but because 
including them distorts the relevancy of the results of our analysis.18 In the same vein, the log of 
zero is equal to minus infinity, hence zeros may be considered outliers in a log-linear regression 
analysis. 
Suppose that the quality indicator X୧כ takes the following value for cartel i: 
X୧
כ ൌ A ൅ Y୧B ൅ Z୧C ൅ u୧
כ (25) 
where u୧כ follows a standard normal distribution. Assume that this latent variable is such that the 
cartel i is included in the meta-analysis if and only if X୧כ ൐ 0, while the cartel is exluded 
otherwise.19 By definition, Equation (12) is estimated only on the portion of the sample where 
X୧
כ ൐ 0. The expectation of the overcharge estimates on this subsample is: 
EሺX୧|Y, Z, X୧
כ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅ Z୧γ ൅ Eሺε୧|X୧
כ ൐ 0ሻ   ሺ26ሻ 
Hence, the sample selection bias is controlled by estimating the following equation, which is 
Equation (12) augmented with the term Eሺε୧|X୧כ ൐ 0ሻ. We have: 
X୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅ Z୧γ ൅ Eሺε୧|X୧
כ ൐ 0ሻ ൅ e୧,    ሺ27ሻ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and therefore, using it without caution to estimate the model will produce distorted results that does not 
reflect the situation of the typical woman. 
16 Deleting observations with overcharge estimates that are ≥50% is quite conservative in light of the 
economic theory on mark-ups from which it appears that overcharges of more than 10% are quite dubious. 
For instance, a threshold of 10% would be reasonable according to Cohen and Scheffman (1989).     
17 A latent variable is an unobserved variable that may have observable implications. A latent variable may 
be inferred using some of its observable implications along with mild identification assumptions. 
18 Although we suspects that these observations are more biased than others, this is not the main or only 
reason justifying their exclusion. 
19 This model is consistent with all situations where X୧כ ൒ b for zero overcharge estimates, X୧כ ൏ ܾ for 
estimates lying strictly between 0% and 50% and X୧כ ൒ b the for observations above 50%. This amounts to 
assuming that the latent factor is nonlinear in the overcharge estimates. Note that there is no excluded 
variable in the second step. The same variables are used in both the latent variable equation and the 
observation equation. The nonlinearity assumption imposed on the latent variable appears to be a powerful 
identification tool in this model. It is also consistent with the fact that zero overcharge estimates are likely to 
be less biased than those larger than or equal to 50%.  
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where the error term e୧ ؠ ε୧ െ Eሺε୧|X୧כ ൐ 0ሻ has zero expectation by construction. It can be shown 
that: 
Eሺε୧|X୧
כ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ θ ஦
ሺAାY౟BାZ౟Cሻ
஍ሺAାY౟BାZ౟Cሻ 
   ሺ28ሻ 
where the theoretical value of θ is Corrሺε୧, u୧ሻσෝகଶ and φ and Φ are the standard normal density and 
cumulative distributions respectively (See Heckman, 1979).20 Similarly, we have: 
Eሺε୧|X୧
כ ൏ 0ሻ ൌ െθ ஦
ሺAାY౟BାZ౟Cሻ
ଵି஍ሺAାY౟BାZ౟Cሻ 
   ሺ29ሻ 
Let us consider the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) defined as: 
imr୧ ൌ
஦ሺAାY౟BାZ౟Cሻ
஍ሺAାY౟BାZ౟Cሻ 
    if X୧
כ ൐ 0   ሺ30ሻ 
imr୧ ൌ
ି஦ሺAାY౟BାZ౟Cሻ
ଵି஍ሺAାY౟BାZ౟Cሻ 
    if X୧
כ ൏ 0  ሺ31ሻ 
When restricted to the subsample of cartels defined by X୧
כ ൐ 0, the estimating equation ሺ27ሻ 
is equivalent to: 
X୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅ Z୧γ ൅ imr୧θ ൅ e୧,    ሺ32ሻ 
A similar methodology also applies to the log-linear model (13).21  
If the IMR is not included in the estimating equation, the coefficients β and γ are estimated 
with bias. In this case, the model can still be used to predict the mean overcharge conditional on 
X୧
כ ൐ 0, but not conditional on Y or Z. Given this, only the model that controls for sample 
selection can be used to bias-correct individual overcharge estimates. 
A probit can be estimated to infer fitted values of X୧כ and the IMR. Such a probit analysis 
is interesting per se because it permits to see the categories of cartels that have been excluded the 
most. We do not observe the latent variable, but we do know if an observation is excluded (Ii=0) or 
not (Ii=1). If observation i is not excluded, then it must be the case that X୧כ ൐ 0, which in turn 
implies that A ൅ Y୧B ൅ Z୧C ൅ u୧כ ൐ 0, or equivalently, -u୧כ ൏ ܣ ൅ Y୧B ൅ Z୧C. Because u୧כ is standard 
normal, the likelihood of this observation is equal to: 
L୧ ൌ ΦሺA ൅ Y୧B ൅ Z୧Cሻ  ሺ33ሻ 
                                                            
20 This result is obtained by exploiting the definition of Eሺε୧|X୧כ ൐ 0ሻ, which is the expectation of ε with 
respect to its density conditional on -u୧כ ൏ ܣ ൅ Y୧B ൅ Z୧C. This density is of truncated type and is obtained by 
exploiting the bivariate Gaussian distribution of (εi, u୧כ). See Heckman (1979) for details. 
21 The same inverse Mills ratio is used in both the linear and log-linear model. At this point, it is difficult to 
tell which model will provide the best fit. 
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where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. Likewise, if observation i is 
excluded, then it must be the case that X୧כ ൏ 0, which in turn implies that -u୧כ ൐ ܣ ൅ Y୧B ൅ Z୧C. 
Hence the likelihood of an excluded observation is given by 1 െ L୧, where L୧ is defined above. The 
sample log-likelihood of the probit is thus given by: 
ࣦሺA, B, Cሻ ൌ ∑ ሼI୧ כ logL୧ ൅ ሺ1 െ I୧ሻ כ log ሺ1 െ L୧ሻሽ
T
୧ୀଵ   ሺ34ሻ 
Maximizing this log-likelihood with respect to parameters A, B and C gives the probit estimators 
A෡, B෡ and C෠ , whose values are reported in Table 4. 
The probit results show that international cartels have been excluded more than domestic 
cartels as the latter coefficient is positive and significant.22 This is consistent with the fact that in 
the Connor sample, the overcharge estimates of international cartels are higher than those of 
domestic cartels. We also see that cartels involved in bid-rigging have been excluded less than 
those involved in other price fixing collusions. Cartels that pleaded guilty have been excluded less 
than those that did not. Cartels of the ROW have been excluded less than those of the benchmark 
category WORLD, but the difference if not statistically significant. In trun, the WORLD cartels 
have been excluded less than those of the US, EU and ASIA groups. Finally, cartels of the period 
P6 have been excluded less than those of periods P1 to P5.  
Estimates obtained by the econometric method (used as benchmark) have been excluded 
less than those computed by other methods as the coefficients of all the methods are negative and 
significant. This indicates that the use of econometric methods in the original studies tend to 
conclude with overcharge estimates in the interval 0% to 50%. Finally, estimates published in 
government report (used as benchmark) have been discarded more than those published in other 
publication sources as the coefficients of all the publication media are positive. 
 
  
                                                            
22 We consider a one-sided test and 10% significance level. 
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Table 4 
A probit model for the inclusion of cartels into the meta-analysis 
(Variables with positive coefficients are correlated with inclusion, and vice versa) 
  Coefficients Student-t23 
Constant 0.03 0.10 
Duration -0.01 -0.22
Domestic 0.61 5.29 
BidRig 0.49 3.65 
Guilty 0.15 1.29 
US -0.41 -2.83
EU -0.15 -1.19
ASIA -0.56 -2.86 
ROW 0.29 1.02 
P1 0.44 0.83 
P3 0.14 0.69
P4 0.22 1.04
P5 0.02 0.10 
P6 0.28 1.37 
OTHER  -0.77 -3.75 
HISTOR -1.40 -4.01
PBEFOR  -0.24 -1.55 
PWAR  -0.63 -2.02 
PAFTER  -0.29 -1.66 
COST  -0.48 -2.14 
YARDST -0.44 -2.54
LEGAL  0.09 0.46 
JOURNAL  0.25 1.31 
MONOGR  0.37 2.08 
EDBOOK  0.15 0.61 
COURT 0.35 1.73
WORKP  0.81 3.76 
SPEECH  1.16 1.71 
Sample size24 1119 
 
Let X෡୧
כ
ൌ A෡ ൅ Y୧B෡ ൅ Z୧C෠  be the fitted values of X୧כ. Empirically, the sample selection bias 
is controlled in the meta analysis by including the estimated inverse Mills ratio as an additional 
regressor. For an included cartel, we have: 
ımrෞ ୧ ൌ
஦൫ X෡౟
כ
 ൯
஍൫ X෡౟
כ
 ൯
  ሺ35ሻ 
                                                            
23 A coefficient is significant in a one sided 10% level test if the corresponding student-t is larger than 1.28 in 
absolute value. 
24 In the original database, there is one overcharge estimate with publication source labelled as “OTHER”. 
This observation has been excluded from the meta-analysis. 
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Heckman (1979) shows that including ımrෞ ୧ as an additional regressor in (12) and (13) allows to 
consistently estimate the coefficients of the model linking the dependent variable (original 
overcharge estimates) to the explanatory variables Y and Z, almost as if the whole sample were 
available or used. The estimating equation is thus given by: 
X୧ ൌ α ൅ Y୧β ൅ Z୧γ ൅ ımrෞ ୧θ ൅ e୧.  ሺ36ሻ 
The coefficients estimated from (36) using the subsample of positive but less than 50% overcharge 
estimates can be used to bias-correct the overcharge estimates that have been included in the 
regression and those that have been excluded as well.25 The bias-correction formulas are presented 
in detail in Section 6 below. 
In summary, the approach taken in our meta-analysis is as follows. First, outliers are 
excluded to avoid distorting the relevancy of the regression results. Second, we construct 
nonparametrically four clusters (groups of cartels), whose indicators are included in the regression 
analysis in interaction with the bias factors (the Z variables) to control for the remaining 
heterogeneity in the data. Third, a probit analysis is conducted from which an inverse Mills ratio is 
generated and included in the regression analysis to correct for the non-random nature of the 
truncation of the sample. Fourth, regression models linking the original overchage estimates to 
explanatory variables Y and Z as well as to the predicted value of the inverse Mills ratios obtained 
from the probit analysis are estimated. Finally, bias-corrected mean and median estimates are 
obtained for different subgroups of cartels.  
 
6.  Bias­correcting the Initial Overcharge Estimates 
We estimate both the linear and log-linear model using the same Y and Z variables as in 
Connor and Bolotova (2006).26 We estimate the models with and without controlling for sample 
selection bias. The estimated coefficients for the Y variables are shown in Table 5 while those of 
the Z variables are shown in Appendix B. The coefficients of the Z variables in clusters 1 and 2 are 
generally negative and significant while those of clusters 3 and 4 are generally positive and 
significant. This confirms that the sample of overcharge estimates is heterogenous. These 
discrepancies play an important role in explaining the large magnitude of the bias. 
                                                            
25 The formula of the IMR for an excluded cartel only serves for bias-correction. See section 6. 
26 Even with no interaction, the coefficients of the ܼ variables are not directly comparable with the results of 
Connor and Bolotova (2006) because we have changed the reference variables. Connor and Bolotova (2006) 
used PAFTER and MONOGR as references variables for the method of calculation and source of 
publication, while we use ECON and GOVREP respectively. Also, the modality P6 of the antitrust law 
regime now covers periods from 1991 to 2010. 
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We see two main differences with respect to the results of Connor and Bolotova (2006). 
First, the coefficient of the duration variable is not statistically significant in a conventional 5% 
level two-sided test. In the log-linear model, this coefficient is significant at level 10% in a one 
sided test, but is also estimated to be low (0,03%). This finding suggests that the ability of a cartel 
of five to ten year duration to raise its price is not very different from that of a cartel of zero to five 
year duration. Second, the results from the log-linear model suggest that cartels resolved with plea 
agreements display significantly higher overcharges than other cartels. Otherwise, our results are 
qualitatively similar to those of Connor and Bolotova (2006) regarding the signs of the estimated 
coefficients. To choose between the linear and log-linear model, we compare the variance ratio 
(variance explained ove total variance). This ratio is 11.16% for the linear model and 13.40% for 
the log-linear model. Hence, the log-linear model explains the variance of the original estimates to 
a greater extent and for this reason is the preferred model. 
After estimating the meta-regression model (with or without controlling for selection bias), 
bias-corrected overcharge estimates can be computed. Bias-corrected estimates are obtained by 
eliminating the impact of the ܼ variables from a given initial estimator ௜ܺ.  
In the linear model, the expected bias-corrected overcharge estimates are given by:  
X෡୧ ൌ αෝ ൅ Y୧β෠ ൅ ımrෞ ୧θ෠  ሺ37ሻ 
where ımrෞ ୧ is given by Equation (30) for included cartels and by Equation (31) for excluded 
cartels.27 In the log-linear model, the bias-corrected overcharge estimate is given by: 28 
X෡୧ ൌ exp൫αෝ ൅ Y୧β෠ ൅ ımrෞ ୧θ෠  ൅ σෝୣଶ/2൯,  ሺ38ሻ 
assuming that ݁௜~ܰሺ0, σୣଶሻ. The  contribution  of  the  IMR  reflects  the  amount  by  which  the 
expected  overcharge  of  a  cartel  deviates  from  the  expected  overcharge  over  the  whole 
sample,  given  that  this  cartel  is  included  or  not.  The  presence  of  the  IMR  in  the  bias‐
correction  formula  allows  to  fully  exploit  the  whole  information  set  that  conditions  the 
estimation,  which  is  the  knowledge  of  the  regressors  and  the  knwoledge  of  the  selection 
criterion.  Again, the formula of the IMR depends on whether the cartel is included in the 
regression or not. 
  
                                                            
27 In a previous version of this paper, we did not use the IMR in the bias-correction formula of excluded 
cartels. It appears that this is an important omission since excluded cartels are also subject to an “exclusion” 
bias that is proportional to (31). 
28 In the lognormal framework, the average overcharge of an included cartel is equal to  
exp൫αෝ ൅ Y୧β෠ ൅ ımrෞ ୧θ෠൯ multiplied by the smearing factor expሺσෝୣଶ/2ሻ. 
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Table 5 
Estimation Coefficients for the Y variables 
Mean overcharge 1 is the estimated average bias‐corrected (bc) overcharge for the subsample of positive 
initial estimates below 50%. Mean overcharge 2 is the same for the whole sample. 
Linear regression  Log‐linear regression 
Coefficients  Student‐t  Coefficients  Student‐t 
N
o 
se
le
ct
io
n 
bi
as
 c
on
tr
ol
 
Constant  17.26  13,80  2,35  16,32 
Duration  0.06  0,34  0,03  1,49 
Domestic  ‐0.51  ‐1,17  ‐0,03  ‐0,67 
BidRig  ‐0.37  ‐0,86  ‐0,03  ‐0,58 
Guilty  0.68  1,53  0,20  3,88 
US  0.38  0,65  0,02  0,32 
EU  0.54  1,06  0,01  0,21 
ASIA  1.17  1,59  0,05  0,64 
ROW  0.34  0,38  0,10  1,00 
P1  ‐1.31  ‐0,66  ‐0,01  ‐0,03 
P3  ‐1.19  ‐1,30  ‐0,15  ‐1,45 
P4  ‐1.39  ‐1,54  ‐0,18  ‐1,75 
P5  ‐0.92  ‐1,00  ‐0,11  ‐1,00 
P6  ‐0.56  ‐0,65  ‐0,14  ‐1,45 
Var(epsilon)  18.15  0,24 
Mean bc overcharge 1  17.18  12.09 
Variance ratio  11.16  13,40 
Sample size  786 
Co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 S
el
ec
tio
n 
bi
as
 
Constant  16.72  4,60  2,85  6,80 
Duration  0.05  0,33  0,03  1,56 
Domestic  ‐0.32  ‐0,25  ‐0,21  ‐1,41 
BidRig  ‐0.25  ‐0,28  ‐0,14  ‐1,38 
Guilty  0.74  1,24  0,14  2,04 
US  0.25  0,25  0,14  1,21 
EU  0.49  0,81  0,06  0,84 
ASIA  1.00  0,78  0,21  1,40 
ROW  0.40  0,41  0,05  0,45 
P1  ‐1.16  ‐0,53  ‐0,14  ‐0,57 
P3  ‐1.16  ‐1,22  ‐0,19  ‐1,71 
P4  ‐1.33  ‐1,35  ‐0,24  ‐2,11 
P5  ‐0.90  ‐0,96  ‐0,13  ‐1,20 
P6  ‐0.46  ‐0,44  ‐0,23  ‐1,91 
IMR  0.66  0,16  ‐0,61  ‐1,25 
Var(epsilon)  18.18  0,24 
Mean bc overcharge 1  17.11  13.62 
Mean bc overcharge 2  15.79  17.52 
Variance ratio  11. 15  15.56 
Sample size  786 
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In the log-linear model, the estimated variance for the error term is 0.24 in both cases, that 
is, when sample selection is controlled and when it is not. However, the percentage of variance 
explained by the bias corrected overcharge estimate is higher when sample selection is controlled 
compared to when it is not. This difference comes from the inclusion of the IMR which alters the 
estimated values for all coefficients. In particular, it alters the estimated proportion of variance due 
to the bias factors (the Z variables). 
We have applied the bias-correction formulas given above only to cartels with initially 
positive overcharge estimate. Two reasons explain this choice. First, the empirical distribution of 
overcharge estimates exhibits a mass at zero. This means that neither the linear model nor the log-
linear model can fit this distribution at zero.29 Second, the predictions of the log-linear model are 
necessarily positive, which indicates that this model always overestimates zero overcharges. Thus, 
and for simplicity, we report a 0% bias-corrected overcharge for a cartel with an initial estimate 
equal to zero.30 
In Table 6, we present the average bias-corrected overcharge estimates for the categories of 
cartels prevously considered in Table 1. The log-linear model predicts for the subsample with 
initial estimates lying in the range 0% to 50% a mean overcharge estimate of 13.62% with a 
median of 13.63% and for all cartels of all types a mean of 17.52% with a median of 14.05%. Both 
mean and median overcharge estimates are of interest here. Indeed, the mean is roughly identical to 
the median for the subsample while the mean is significantly larger than the median for the whole 
sample. This indicates that the bias-corrected overcharges estimated for the subsample with initial 
estimates above 50% contains outliers. Hence, the median should be given more consideration than 
the mean when the whole sample is considered. The median is 14.05% for the whole sample, which 
is quite close to the mean of 13.62% obtained for the subsample with initial estimates lying in the 
range 0% to 50%. 
In a standard Heckman analysis, the portion of the sample that is excluded is not observed 
and hence, the analysis would stop with the first set of estimated results (mean overcharge estimate 
of 13.62% with a median of 13.63%). In our case, the regressors are observed for the all 
obervations. The excluded observations have been excluded because of the realizations of the 
dependent variables (the initial overcharge estimates) for these observations which are too 
influential to be included in the same regression analysis as the remainder of the sample. Moreover, 
these high initial overcharge estimates are not supported by any economic theory. If the quality of 
the observations were the same for the whole sample, an approach inspired from the treatment 
                                                            
29 In fact, these models are not rich enough for the purpose of bias-correcting zero overcharges. 
30 This may affect the average bias‐corrected overcharge over the whole sample ሺthe “All cartels” 
column of Table 6 belowሻ, but it does not affect the average of positive  estimates. 
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effect literature could have been used. In the latter approach, all observations are included in the 
regession of the X or logX onto Y, Z and the IMR, with the formula of the IMR depending on 
whether the realization of X lies above 50% or not. To accomodate the nature of the data, the 
approach that we advocated is halfway. It consists first of estimating the parameters of interest 
using a Heckman regression as if the bad quality observations were not available. Next, the 
estimated coefficients are used together with the realizations of the regressors to predict the 
dependent variables for the bad quality observations. These predictions give an assessment of what 
the realizations X or logX should have been if they were measured without bias.      
The log-linear model predicts for US cartels a mean overcharge estimate of 13.73% (with a 
median of 13.75%) for the subsample and 16.45% (with a median of 14.01%) for the whole 
sample. For EU cartels, the corresponding figures are 13.08% (13.32%) and 17.75% (13.78%). The 
model predicts moreover that the mean overcharge estimate of international cartels are larger than 
that of domestic cartels by 0.73 (or 5.5% more profitable) and 4.20 percentage points (or 27.5% 
more profitable) for the subsample and the whole sample respectively (not considering the 
potentially different costs of forming and maintaining international versus domestic cartels). 
Finally, it predicts that recent cartels (post-1973) achieved slightly lower mean but slightly larger 
median overcharges than cartels of the more distant past (pre-1973).  
An important feature of Table 6 is that the mean and median bias-corrected overcharge 
estimates shows a more homogenous behaviour of cartels accross different types, geographical 
locations and periods than suggested by the raw data of Table 1. In a sense, this suggests that a 
cartel is a cartel is a cartel. 
Table 7 shows average bias-corrected overcharge estimates for different categories of 
cartels according to whether they are domestic or international, in bid-rigging cases of not, and/or 
were found or pleaded guilty or not. Table 8 shows median bias-corrected overcharge estimates for 
the same subgroups. The differences between the raw overcharge estimates (Table 1 and the left-
hand side of Tables 7 and 8) and the bias-corrected ones (Table 6 and the right-hand side of Tables 
7 and 8) are striking, both in terms of levels and in terms of orderings. The medians of the 
subgroups do not change too much as one moves from the whole sample to the subsample with 
initial estimates lying within the range 0%-50%. This suggests that the subsample is quite 
representative of the whole universe of cartels as long as the median bias-corrected overcharge 
estimate is given more consideration than the mean. Finally, note that the mean and median 
overcharge estimates in Tables 7 and 8 are sometimes higher in the subsample than in the whole 
sample. This stems from the fact that zero estimates are part of the whole sample while they are 
excluded from the subsample.  
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Table 6 
Bias-corrected mean and median overcharge estimates (OE)   
The prop.% are fractions of the total Connor sample (1120 cartels) 
 
  
All 
Cartels 
OE > 0%  0% < OE < 50%  OE ≥ 50% 
Cartels 
Before 
1973 
Cartels 
After 
1973 
All locations 
Mean  17,52  18,89  13,62  35,28  17,87  17,39 
Median  14,05  14,35  13,63  34,23  13,45  14,22 
prop.  100,00  92,77  70,18  22,59  28,50  71,50 
US 
Mean  16,45  18,13  13,73  34,70  17,92  15,76 
Median  14,01  14,27  13,75  32,52  13,94  14,14 
prop.  30,00  27,23  21,52  5,71  9,64  20,36 
EU 
Mean  17,75  18,97  13,08  34,16  17,70  17,79 
Median  13,78  13,90  13,32  32,55  13,40  14,03 
prop.  33,48  31,34  22,59  8,75  13,39  20,09 
Domestic 
Mean  15,29  16,80  13,26  37,00  16,86  14,59 
Median  13,40  13,55  13,32  35,80  13,40  13,39 
prop.  46,79  42,59  36,25  6,34  14,46  32,32 
International 
Mean  19,49  20,67  13,99  34,61  18,90  19,70 
Median  15,44  15,64  14,03  33,91  13,67  15,52 
prop.  53,21  50,18  33,93  16,25  14,02  39,20 
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Table 7 
Raw versus Bias-corrected mean cartel overcharge estimates.  
The values reported in the last group of columns are the empirical averages of the bias-corrected overcharges  
predicted by the log-linear model, controlling for sample selection.  
“n.a.” means that the corresponding category of cartels is not represented in the sample or subsample.  
Cartel characteristics  Raw  Average Estimates    Bias‐Corrected Average Estimates 
domestic  bidrig  guilty  US  EU  ASIA  ROW WORLD    US  EU  ASIA  ROW WORLD 
Subsample with initial overcharge estimates lying between 0% and 50% 
Yes  Yes  Yes  19,69 15,56  25,65 17,40 18,70  13,61 13,06 13,47 12,77 12,62 
No  Yes  No  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Yes  No  No  18,88 17,60  20,49 18,67 n.a.  12,05 11,8  11,46 12,21 n.a. 
No  No  Yes  19,27 21,25  17,25 21,21 23,85  15,50 14,42 15,43 15,39 15,03 
Yes  Yes  No  11,57 16,67  4,88  14,50 n.a.  11,44 10,68 12,32 11,73 n.a. 
No  Yes  Yes  22,20 18,20  25,53 28,73 10,23  14,60 14,07 14,78 16,50 14,41 
Yes  No  Yes  18,70 17,77  22,39 11,41 n.a.  15,05 13,95 14,11 13,82 n.a. 
No  No  No  29,50 23,29  29,00 n.a.  23,97  11,12 10,94 10,92 n.a.  11,35 
Whole sample 
Yes  Yes  Yes  26,73 17,38  29,47 17,40 18,70  15,93 13,06 17,61 12,77 12,62 
No  Yes  No  n.a.  430,00 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  28,55 n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Yes  No  No  46,72 20,15  77,15 17,12 n.a.  16,31 12,21 15,23 11,19 n.a. 
No  No  Yes  27,67 52,78  37,60 24,49 71,79  19,28 21,41 21,35 18,32 21,11 
Yes  Yes  No  21,18 16,67  4,88  14,50 n.a.  15,68 10,68 12,32 11,73 n.a. 
No  Yes  Yes  38,05 32,89  35,40 28,73 20,18  20,44 21,19 19,97 16,50 19,26 
Yes  No  Yes  44,51 20,52  51,24 11,41 n.a.  15,63 16,39 18,87 13,82 n.a. 
No  No  No  46,56 72,20  29,00 50,00 34,29  16,47 19,80 10,92 23,24 12,56 
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Table 8 
Raw versus Bias-corrected median cartel overcharge estimates.  
The values reported in the last group of columns are the empirical medians of the bias-corrected overcharges  
predicted by the log-linear model, controlling for sample selection.  
“n.a.” means that the corresponding category of cartels is not represented in the sample or subsample.  
Cartel characteristics  Raw  Median Estimates         Bias‐Corrected Median Estimates
domestic  bidrig  guilty  US  EU  ASIA  ROW  WORLD       US  EU  ASIA  ROW WORLD
Subsample with initial overcharge estimates lying between 0% and 50% 
Yes  Yes  Yes  17,40 12,30  28,80 17,40 18,70  13,75 12,59 13,47 12,77 12,62 
No  Yes  No  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Yes  No  No  18,25 15,65  19,00 17,50 n.a.  12,03 11,85 11,17 11,95 n.a. 
No  No  Yes  10,40 19,23  17,50 20,30 22,30  15,57 14,12 15,64 15,62 15,44 
Yes  Yes  No    8,00 17,00    4,83 14,50 n.a.  11,34 10,65 12,90 11,73 n.a. 
No  Yes  Yes  20,50 14,00  18,10 30,55 11,90  14,45 14,01 13,93 16,58 13,67 
Yes  No  Yes  15,50 15,10  20,00 10,00 n.a.  15,19 13,55 13,90 13,46 n.a. 
No  No  No  30,50 23,50  29,00 n.a.  26,25  11,39 10,98 10,92 n.a.  11,66 
Whole sample 
Yes  Yes  Yes  18,05 12,15  29,00 17,40 18,70  13,76 12,59 13,47 12,77 12,62 
No  Yes  No  n.a.  430,00 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  28,55 n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Yes  No  No  24,70 13,50  24,50 13,60 n.a.  12,30 11,48 11,47 11,95 n.a. 
No  No  Yes  27,80 29,00  17,50 21,65 29,60  16,25 15,40 15,64 15,68 15,86 
Yes  Yes  No  14,50 17,00  4,83  14,50 n.a.  11,50 10,65 12,90 11,73 n.a. 
No  Yes  Yes  25,75 17,00  29,80 30,55 13,45  15,18 14,65 15,48 16,58 15,00 
Yes  No  Yes  14,90 15,95  23,25 10,00 n.a.  15,01 13,76 14,46 13,46 n.a. 
No  No  No  36,50 50,00  29,00 50,00 25,00  11,59 25,39 10,92 23,24 11,66 
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7.  Conclusion  
The study determines the typical mean and median cartel overcharges by performing a 
meta-analysis similar to the one of Connor and Bolotova (2006). Our study is based on an extended 
version of the database used in Connor (2010b). First, we recall that the sample consists of 
estimates of overcharges rather than natural observations. Thus, each observation of the sample is 
subject to potential estimation bias, model errors and publication bias. Second, a quick examination 
of the sample reveals an asymmetric empirical distribution, the presence of outliers and a 
significant amount of heterogeneity. Although the outliers are few in number, they are able to push 
the mean of strictly positive overcharge estimates up to 49%. Indeed, this mean drops to 32% when 
the 5% most influential observations are removed from the sample. This empirical mean further 
drops to 20.6% when overcharge estimates that are larger than or equal to 50% are removed. 
Moreover, even if the data were exempt of estimation bias, model errors and publication bias, 
performing an OLS regression without properly addressing the problem of asymmetry, 
heterogeneity and outliers will necessarily produce distorted results. 
We address the asymmetry problem by taking the logarithm of overcharge estimates. In 
order to improve the relevancy and quality of the results of the meta-analysis, overcharge estimates 
that are larger than or equal to 50% (22.6% of the sample) are first excluded from the estimation. 
Zero overcharge estimates (7.2% of the sample) are also excluded because the log of zero is either 
equal to minus infinity (an outlier) or undefined. To control the sample selection bias raised by the 
exclusion of a portion of the sample, a probit regression is estimated from which an inverse Mills 
ratio is obtained and included as a regressor in subsequent regressions (Heckman 1979). 
Focusing on the subsample of included cartels (786 cartels), we regress the log of 
overcharge estimates on a number of explanatory variables. A first group of regressors Y captures 
the true overcharge, while a second group Z captures potential biases. To control heterogenity, a 
cluster analysis is used to segregate the included cartels into four homogenous clusters. The cluster 
indicators are then interacted with the variables capturing the biases, yielding a log-linear model in 
which the coefficients of the bias-correction exercise differ across clusters. The log-linear model 
produces a better fit compared to the linear model. 
Our results show that the size of the bias depend on the overcharge estimation method and 
the publication media of the original estimates. The meta-analysis predicts that, controlling for 
sample selection, the mean bias-corrected overcharge estimate is about 13.6% (with a median of 
13.6%) for the subsample of cartels with initial estimates lying between 0% and 50% and 17.5% 
(with a median of 14.05%) for  the whole sample. These results differ significantly from the raw 
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figures (Table 1) which are 20.61% (with a median of 18.38%) and 45.47% (with a median of 
23.00%) for the subsample and the whole sample respectively.  
The comparison of mean and median bias-corrected overcharge estimates accross different 
types, geographical locations and periods reveals a fairly homogenous behavior of cartels, a rather 
interesting feature that differs significantly from the highly heterogeneous behavior observed in the 
raw data. 
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Appendix A: Summary of the Variables 
  
A1. Whole Sample 
  mean std min max 
Overcharge Estimates 45.47 102.86 0,00 1800,00 
Duration 9.25 11.86 1 109 
duration (discrete) 1.86 1.06 1 4 
Domestic 0.47 0.50 0 1 
BidRig 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Guilty 0.66 0.48 0 1 
US 0.30 0.46 0 1 
EU 0.33 0.47 0 1 
ASIA 0.09 0.28 0 1 
ROW 0.04 0.19 0 1 
WORLD 0.24 0.43 0 1 
P1 0.01 0.08 0 1 
P2 0.10 0.30 0 1 
P3 0.11 0.31 0 1 
P4 0.15 0.35 0 1 
P5 0.57 0.50 0 1 
P6 0.07 0.25 0 1 
OTHER  0.06 0.24 0 1 
HISTOR  0.02 0.13 0 1 
PBEFOR  0.27 0.44 0 1 
PWAR  0.02 0.14 0 1 
PAFTER  0.13 0.34 0 1 
COST  0.05 0.21 0 1 
YARDST  0.14 0.35 0 1 
ECON 0.14 0.34 0 1 
LEGAL  0.18 0.38 0 1 
JOURNAL  0.22 0.41 0 1 
MONOGR  0.23 0.42 0 1 
EDBOOK  0.06 0.24 0 1 
GOVREP 0.23 0.42 0 1 
COURT  0.18 0.38 0 1 
WORKP  0.01 0.07 0 1 
SPEECH  0.07 0.25 0 1 
Sample size 1120 
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A2. Included cartels 
  mean std min max 
Overcharge Estimates 20.61 12.34 0.10 49.90 
Duration 9.26 11.95 1 98 
duration (discrete) 1.84 1.05 1 4 
Domestic 0.52 0.50 0 1 
BidRig 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Guilty 0.72 0.45 0 1 
US 0.31 0.46 0 1 
EU 0.32 0.47 0 1 
ASIA 0.09 0.29 0 1 
ROW 0.04 0.20 0 1 
WORLD 0.24 0.43 0 1 
P1 0.01 0.09 0 1 
P2 0.09 0.28 0 1 
P3 0.10 0.30 0 1 
P4 0.13 0.34 0 1 
P5 0.62 0.49 0 1 
P6 0.05 0.23 0 1 
OTHER  0.05 0.21 0 1 
HISTOR  0.01 0.08 0 1 
PBEFOR  0.27 0.44 0 1 
PWAR  0.02 0.13 0 1 
PAFTER  0.13 0.34 0 1 
COST  0.04 0.20 0 1 
YARDST  0.13 0.34 0 1 
ECON 0.16 0.37 0 1 
LEGAL  0.19 0.39 0 1 
JOURNAL  0.22 0.41 0 1 
MONOGR  0.21 0.41 0 1 
EDBOOK  0.05 0.21 0 1 
GOVREP 0.25 0.43 0 1 
COURT  0.22 0.41 0 1 
WORKP  0.01 0.08 0 1 
SPEECH  0.05 0.22 0 1 
Sample size 786 
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A3. Cartels with Overcharge Estimate Equal to zero (Excluded) 
  mean std min max 
Overcharge Estimates 0 0 0 0 
duration 9.38 12.27 1 72 
duration (discrete) 1.86 1.10 1 4 
domestic 0.58 0.50 0 1 
BidRig 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Guilty 0.37 0.49 0 1 
US 0.38 0.49 0 1 
EU 0.30 0.46 0 1 
ASIA 0.09 0.28 0 1 
ROW 0.04 0.19 0 1 
WORLD 0.20 0.40 0 1 
P1 0.00 0.00 0 0 
P2 0.19 0.39 0 1 
P3 0.05 0.22 0 1 
P4 0.25 0.43 0 1 
P5 0.47 0.50 0 1 
P6 0.05 0.22 0 1 
OTHER  0.16 0.37 0 1 
HISTOR  0.14 0.34 0 1 
PBEFOR  0.20 0.40 0 1 
PWAR  0.01 0.11 0 1 
PAFTER  0.11 0.32 0 1 
COST  0.04 0.19 0 1 
YARDST  0.09 0.28 0 1 
ECON 0.02 0.16 0 1 
LEGAL  0.23 0.43 0 1 
JOURNAL  0.44 0.50 0 1 
MONOGR  0.21 0.41 0 1 
EDBOOK  0.10 0.30 0 1 
GOVREP 0.09 0.28 0 1 
COURT  0.05 0.22 0 1 
WORKP  0.00 0.00 0 0 
SPEECH  0.11 0.32 0 1 
Sample size 81 
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A4. Cartels with Overcharge Estimate Larger than or Equal to 50% (Excluded) 
  mean std min max 
Overcharge Estimates 137.26 188.29 50.00 1800.00 
duration 9.18 11.50 1 109 
duration (discrete) 1.93 1.08 1 4 
domestic 0.28 0.45 0 1 
BidRig 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Guilty 0.57 0.50 0 1 
US 0.25 0.44 0 1 
EU 0.39 0.49 0 1 
ASIA 0.08 0.28 0 1 
ROW 0.02 0.12 0 1 
WORLD 0.26 0.44 0 1 
P1 0.01 0.09 0 1 
P2 0.13 0.34 0 1 
P3 0.15 0.35 0 1 
P4 0.16 0.37 0 1 
P5 0.45 0.50 0 1 
P6 0.11 0.31 0 1 
OTHER  0.08 0.28 0 1 
HISTOR  0.01 0.09 0 1 
PBEFOR  0.28 0.45 0 1 
PWAR  0.03 0.18 0 1 
PAFTER  0.14 0.35 0 1 
COST  0.06 0.24 0 1 
YARDST  0.20 0.40 0 1 
ECON 0.08 0.28 0 1 
LEGAL  0.11 0.31 0 1 
JOURNAL  0.16 0.37 0 1 
MONOGR  0.30 0.46 0 1 
EDBOOK  0.10 0.30 0 1 
GOVREP 0.22 0.42 0 1 
COURT  0.10 0.30 0 1 
WORKP  0.00 0.06 0 1 
SPEECH  0.11 0.31 0 1 
Sample size 253 
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Appendix B: Estimated coefficients for the bias factors. 
In the tables, the Xk denote the interaction variable between ܺ and cluster indicator ݇. 
HISTOR2 and HISTOR3 are missing because they are empty (identically zero). We see that the 
coefficients vary a lot across clusters. For example, the coefficient of JOURNAL1 is – 9.51 (in cluster 
1) while that of JOURNAL2 is െ0.65 (in cluster 2), that of JOURNAL3 is 9.88 (in cluster 3) and that 
of JOURNAL4 is 15.54 (in cluster 4). 31 These large variations in the coefficients of the Z variables 
reflect the large magnitude of the bias of the initial overcharge estimates. 
B1. No sample Selection bias control 
  Linear regression Log-linear regression 
  Coefficients Student-t Coefficients Student-t 
OTHER1 -6.19 -4.58 -0.77 -4.94 
HISTOR1 -4.26 -1.62 -0.70 -2.32 
PBEFOR1 -2.87 -3.03 -0.15 -1.33 
PWAR1 2.50 0.57 0.65 1.28 
PAFTER1 -3.18 -2.65 -0.55 -3.99 
COST1 -5.33 -2.72 -0.97 -4.28 
YARDST1 -3.23 -3.04 -0.21 -1.69 
LEGAL1 -3.12 -3.15 -0.23 -1.98 
JOURNAL1 -9.51 -9.30 -0.74 -6.31 
MONOGR1 -6.36 -5.17 -0.21 -1.46 
EDBOOK1 -9.50 -5.08 -0.57 -2.65 
COURT1 -7.37 -6.52 -0.43 -3.32 
WORKP1 -6.82 -5.82 -0.34 -2.52 
          
OTHER2 -0.12 -0.06 0.05 0.19 
PBEFOR2 -0.16 -0.17 0.12 1.15 
PWAR2 -0.27 -0.14 0.10 0.42 
PAFTER2 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.86 
COST2 -0.22 -0.17 0.08 0.53 
YARDST2 0.34 0.34 0.11 0.91 
LEGAL2 0.54 0.52 0.13 1.12 
JOURNAL2 -0.65 -0.58 0.30 2.36 
MONOGR2 -0.82 -0.71 0.30 2.26 
EDBOOK2 0.58 0.39 0.50 2.90 
COURT2 -1.74 -1.48 0.19 1.41 
WORKP2 -1.77 -1.61 0.24 1.91 
SPEECH2 -4.99 -1.04 0.06 0.10 
              
 
                                                            
31 A parameter is significant at level 10% (resp: 5.%) in a two-sided test if its Student-t is larger than 1.64 
(resp: 1.96) in absolute value. In a one sided test, the thresolds is േ 1.28 at level 10% and േ 1.64 at level 5%. 
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B1. No sample Selection bias control (Continued) 
  Linear regression Log-linear regression 
  Coefficients Student-t Coefficients Student-t 
OTHER3 4.71 2.45 0.37 1.68 
PBEFOR3 1.20 1.33 0.18 1.70 
PWAR3 1.60 0.61 0.21 0.70 
PAFTER3 0.80 0.65 0.18 1.30 
COST3 2.70 1.62 0.29 1.50 
YARDST3 1.22 1.04 0.14 1.04 
LEGAL3 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.80 
JOURNAL3 9.88 8.63 0.81 6.16 
MONOGR3 9.18 7.90 0.76 5.64 
EDBOOK3 9.05 5.45 0.84 4.41 
COURT3 9.09 6.86 0.70 4.57 
WORKP3 8.73 7.75 0.72 5.57 
SPEECH3 5.68 1.74 0.64 1.71 
          
OTHER4 12.74 7.93 0.69 3.73 
HISTOR4 10.01 3.09 0.55 1.48 
PBEFOR4 10.13 8.56 0.57 4.21 
PWAR4 6.83 2.71 0.44 1.51 
PAFTER4 9.81 7.02 0.57 3.55 
COST4 11.38 4.20 0.56 1.79 
YARDST4 10.01 7.29 0.57 3.60 
LEGAL4 8.62 5.70 0.51 2.92 
JOURNAL4 15.54 12.79 0.85 6.06 
MONOGR4 13.29 9.79 0.75 4.82 
EDBOOK4 21.13 13.22 1.19 6.45 
COURT4 13.06 9.44 0.68 4.23 
WORKP4 14.60 10.54 0.73 4.59 
SPEECH4 10.42 3.01 0.69 1.73 
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B2. Controlling for sample selection bias 
  Linear regression Log-linear regression 
  Coefficients Student-t Coefficients Student-t 
OTHER1 -6.43 -3.13 -0.55 -2.31 
HISTOR1 -4.77 -1.14 -0.24 -0.49 
PBEFOR1 -2.93 -2.89 -0.09 -0.80 
PWAR1 2.31 0.50 0.83 1.57 
PAFTER1 -3.26 -2.50 -0.48 -3.20 
COST1 -5.46 -2.55 -0.84 -3.42 
YARDST1 -3.35 -2.56 -0.10 -0.64 
LEGAL1 -3.10 -3.09 -0.25 -2.15 
JOURNAL1 -9.41 -7.77 -0.84 -6.01 
MONOGR1 -6.22 -4.04 -0.34 -1.92 
EDBOOK1 -9.45 -4.99 -0.62 -2.82 
COURT1 -7.26 -5.44 -0.54 -3.48 
WORKP1 -6.57 -3.30 -0.57 -2.50 
          
OTHER2 -0.31 -0.13 0.22 0.79 
PBEFOR2 -0.21 -0.22 0.17 1.49 
PWAR2 -0.44 -0.19 0.25 0.95 
PAFTER2 0.20 0.18 0.16 1.27 
COST2 -0.35 -0.23 0.20 1.14 
YARDST2 0.23 0.19 0.20 1.45 
LEGAL2 0.57 0.54 0.11 0.89 
JOURNAL2 -0.56 -0.44 0.22 1.52 
MONOGR2 -0.68 -0.47 0.18 1.06 
EDBOOK2 0.64 0.41 0.45 2.52 
COURT2 -1.63 -1.18 0.09 0.57 
WORKP2 -1.53 -0.82 0.02 0.12 
SPEECH2 -4.64 -0.88 -0.26 -0.42 
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B2. Controlling for sample selection bias (Continued) 
  Linear regression Log-linear regression 
  Coefficients Student-t Coefficients Student-t 
OTHER3 4.48 1.85 0.59 2.10 
PBEFOR3 1.14 1.17 0.23 2.05 
PWAR3 1.40 0.48 0.39 1.18 
PAFTER3 0.73 0.56 0.25 1.65 
COST3 2.57 1.38 0.41 1.90 
YARDST3 1.09 0.76 0.26 1.57 
LEGAL3 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.72 
JOURNAL3 9.97 7.74 0.73 4.90 
MONOGR3 9.32 6.43 0.63 3.78 
EDBOOK3 9.11 5.36 0.79 4.06 
COURT3 9.22 6.02 0.59 3.33 
WORKP3 8.98 4.63 0.50 2.21 
SPEECH3 6.03 1.53 0.32 0.71 
          
OTHER4 12.49 5.53 0.92 3.53 
HISTOR4 9.48 2.03 1.04 1.93 
PBEFOR4 10.05 7.89 0.64 4.38 
PWAR4 6.65 2.38 0.61 1.90 
PAFTER4 9.73 6.50 0.65 3.76 
COST4 11.23 3.91 0.70 2.10 
YARDST4 9.89 6.31 0.68 3.76 
LEGAL4 8.63 5.70 0.50 2.87 
JOURNAL4 15.64 11.33 0.75 4.74 
MONOGR4 13.44 8.09 0.62 3.22 
EDBOOK4 21.18 12.95 1.14 6.04 
COURT4 13.20 8.14 0.55 2.96 
WORKP4 14.86 6.90 0.50 2.00 
SPEECH4 10.73 2.70 0.41 0.89 
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